

SYMPOSIUM
Québec and the Seventeenth-Century Atlantic World:
Quatercentennial Perspectives

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Rapporteur's summary, by Stephen Pitcher

I

Michael Wintroub (Professor of Rhetoric, University of California, Berkeley) introduced **Thomas G. Barnes**, co-founder and Co-Chair of the Canadian Studies Program and Professor of History and Law at the University of California, Berkeley. Professor Barnes engages in research on Tudor-Stuart Britain and on Canada, and has written widely on English legal history, Tudor-Stuart English history, French legal institutions under Henry IV, law in colonial America, the early history of Nova Scotia, and the history of war.

Thomas G. Barnes

From Fort Caroline to Port Royal: Another Way to Create a New France

Professor Barnes confessed a predilection for deluging his students with thick sheaves of handouts, but contented himself on this occasion with distributing reproductions of a 1605 woodcut depicting Port Royal and playfully titled '*La Petite Maison sur Le Pré*'—"little house on the prairie"--constructed by Champlain, Sieur de Monts, and Poutrincourt. As a youth, Barnes managed to evade the monumental influence of Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1905), in which the evolution of capitalism was attributed to the Protestant, particularly Calvinist, emphasis on enterprise, trade, and wealth for investment. Barnes felt the reverse to be a more valid formulation—that Calvinism was a product of capitalism, the origins of which have now been pushed back to the 14th century. The study of early French settlement in North America reinforces this notion. French North American settlement in its initial stages was principally a commercial undertaking of Calvinists (Huguenots); the role of the French state was a permissive,

rather than an aggressively controlling or participatory, one. The French state at the time was comprised of dynastic, nearly sovereign noble families, with the power of the monarchy centered on the Ile de France and varying widely from province to province, being weakest on the periphery—the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts and the mountainous east. From the mid-15th century, however, a variety of institutions began to strengthen monarchical power in relation to that of the feudatories, contributing to the development of a Protestant Reformation movement which, under Calvin’s influence, increasingly challenged the King’s authority by challenging that of the Pope as vested in the French bishops. This movement—the “Huguenot” phenomenon—was formalized by a national synod of representatives from 66 congregations in France, who secretly promulgated both a confession of faith and a book of discipline (worship). The movement was championed by power-seeking feudatories, seaport-dwelling businessmen—*négociants* and *armateurs*—particularly in La Rochelle, and by the artisans and mariners of the entrepreneurial infrastructure.

The two initial French settlements took place four decades apart—first that of Jean Ribault and his lieutenant René Goulaine de Laudonnière, 1562–65 at *La Caroline* in Florida, the second at *Port Royal* in Nova Scotia, 1604–13, of Pierre du Gua, Sieur de Monts and Samuel de Champlain. Between these two undertakings occurred no less than eight wars of religion in France, fought not just between Roman Catholics (particularly the extreme Guise faction) and Huguenots but entailing a welter of slaughter and martyrdom on all sides, with occasional cessations of hostility being routinely derailed by “stupid acts of violence” and political perfidy. This protracted massacre did not end until the first Bourbon monarch, Henri IV, a Huguenot who converted to Rome in 1594, quipping, “*Paris vaut une messe*” (Barnes noted that he might as well have remarked that *his life* had been well worth a mass when he received the Sacrament to escape the long knives of the St. Bartholomew Day Massacre of 1572).

The first attempt at French settlement was under Huguenot auspices just as the wars of religion began with a vengeance. It was the manifestation of the ambitions of the increasingly entrenched agglomeration of Huguenot city-states (particularly that at La Rochelle) upon which the survival of the Huguenots depended. That undertaking was the short-lived colony, named *La Caroline* in honor of France’s Catholic king, Charles VIII (1560-74), on the estuary of the St. John River some twenty miles east of present-day Jacksonville, Florida. With aspirations to profit from local mineral wealth as well as to provide haven for the religious minority. The colony ran afoul of Spanish aggression and was summarily eradicated by them—the French were murdered for their Protestantism—at Matanzas (“massacres”) Inlet in August 1565.

Henry IV’s conversion encouraged modest attempts at reconciliation of the Huguenots, and an increasing tolerance of the reformed faith found expression in the 1598 designation by the Edict of Nantes of a number of Huguenot-controlled cities, most notably La Rochelle. In effect this resulted in a state-within-a-state scenario that was not conducive to political stability, as subsequent events would demonstrate. But it did stimulate a new enthusiasm for settlement in North America that proved permanent.

The settlement at *Port Royal* in 1604-5, led by the Huguenot Sieur de Monts and Champlain (who was probably Huguenot by birth), was explicitly dedicated to the fur trade. It boasted a diverse population—traders, soldiers, carpenters, writers—and representatives of both Catholic and reformed faiths, with a priest and a pastor reputed to have “fought each other so thoroughly and so hatefully, that when they both happened to die of disease at the same time they were thrown in a common grave, so that they could keep on battling!”

De Monts, his monopoly ineffectually enforced by the Crown, eventually lost his patent, while Champlain moved on to Québec in 1608. A 1610 resettlement headed by Poutrincourt was cut down by the Virginia “buccaneer” Samuel Argall in 1613. Modern Acadia began in the 1630s with the arrival from all over France of farmers—not soldiers, traders, hunters, or fishers, but families intent on agriculture. It owes its tradition of religious tolerance to the influence of Champlain, reinforced by commercial intercourse with Massachusetts (Boston controlled Acadie seven times in the 17th C). Meanwhile New France, under the control of Richelieu, became rigorously and exclusively Roman Catholic, with particular favor shown the Jesuits because of their missionary zeal and focus on education. Still, the colony’s Protestant origins lend it a slightly different aspect from that accorded it by tradition.

Michael Wintroub introduced **Malcolm Smuts** (Professor of History, University of Massachusetts Boston). Professor Smuts performs research on the court culture of England (1580–1640), the history of London (1580–1640), and early Stuart politics and political thought; he is the author of *Culture and Power in England, 1585–1685* and *Court Culture and the Origins of a Royalist Tradition in Early Stuart England*, and the editor of *The Stuart Court and Europe: Essays in Politics and Political Culture*.

Malcolm Smuts

Sea Dogs, Huguenots and the Protestant Atlantic

The traditional emphasis on a nationalistic approach to New World history has produced a concomitant focus on long-term, established settlements: the colony of New France on the St. Lawrence River in Canada is far better known than the short-lived French settlements in Brazil and Florida, although the latter may be the earliest European settlement within the currently configured United States. A national perspective will also elide the significant collaboration between maritime communities of different states. Despite the linguistic and logistical complexity of performing cross-national research, a systematic investigation of the international patterns in which both Old and New World polities were enmeshed would prove extremely productive.

Prior to 1580, France clearly outstripped England both in settling the New World and in raiding Spanish commerce. By the 1560s a mixed-religion French colony existed in Brazil, while a Huguenot colony in Florida served as a base for raiding throughout the Caribbean. In view of their common target, English mariners and Huguenots proved congenial allies.

French maritime vigor was accompanied by the energetic production of printed literature on America and on the strategic significance of the Atlantic, pioneered by the Huguenot leader Admiral Coligny and rapidly translated and disseminated across the Channel. A corresponding English body of literature on Atlantic/American themes, pioneered by Richard Hakluyt the Younger, is firmly based in the Huguenot writings of the 1560s and 1570s. A similar, spoken exchange of ideas occurred, with du Plessis Mornay seemingly influenced by “an international group of Protestants” to which Francis Walsingham, Sir Philip Sidney, and Sir Francis Drake may have belonged, while Elizabeth and her Council may have discussed robbing Spanish flotillas with French Protestants and the Dutch. Such piratical practices took place in the context of a European tradition of maritime predation in which the distinction between merchant, privateer, and pirate was

often small. Piracy proved both a viable alternative to legitimate employment and a continual source of diplomatic friction throughout European waters; French, English, Dutch, and Spanish vessels were engaged in both active and passive capacities and considerable cross-national collaboration took place, well illustrated by the highly diverse and entertaining list of examples provided by Professor Smuts.

Increasingly from the 1560s the proceeds from raiding were used to fund religious warfare on land, with French Huguenots and the Dutch, who saw the capture of Spanish treasure fleets as a logical means of financing war against that country, in the vanguard. England, nominally at peace with France and Spain, was obliged to observe a degree of official restraint; her individual sea captains, however, were not so constrained, and alliances with Huguenot mariners were rapidly formed. Seaport communities in any case invariably hosted a mixture of nationalities, with the possibility of international cooperation always present.

Between the mid-1570s and mid-1580s, the Spanish increased bullion production and reaped an annual income from treasure exceeding in value that of the entire budget of the English Crown. Philip II used this wealth to fund a series of increasingly ominous campaigns. When Sir Francis Drake completed his circumnavigation in 1580 with treasure valued at an estimated twice the annual revenues of the English Crown, the importance of America and the Atlantic to the anti-Spanish cause became obvious. In the intensified Protestant collaboration that ensued, most critically between the English and the Huguenots, raiding on Spanish commerce throughout European waters proved crippling to Philip's aspirations. His re-imposition of an embargo on Spanish trade resulted in the Dutch formation of the East India Company and a direct challenge to Spain's domination of European-Asian commerce.

English-Huguenot collaboration continued, to the indignation of the French Crown, and in confused counterpoint to Buckingham's attempts to negotiate an alliance with France against Spain. The duc de Soubise, La Rochelle's fleet commander, embodied the situation's tense dynamics when he took refuge in Plymouth after losing several engagements with French royal forces off Normandy and Brittany; his lenient treatment by Charles I, contrasted with the distinct antagonism shown members of the French fleet by the English citizenry, painfully strained Anglo-French diplomacy.

The English alliance with Huguenot corsairs lasted up until the fall of La Rochelle in 1628. Thereafter, strategic Anglo-French alliances against Spanish commerce continued to be discussed, but always without result.

The early history of American Empire cannot fully be assessed without examining its roots in European international maritime relations. Similarly, a judicious appraisal of the political, military, and economic history of Europe demands consideration of the Atlantic dimension.

Q&A

Q: There seems to be a lot of leeway if one is looking at the 1520s, 30s, 40s—a lot of pirates in Normandy, many deeply Catholic. They're waging all-out war, with people in Naples and Sicily, people in Le Havre, Rouen, pushing very hard to get involved: how does that play out in your sources, the sectarian versus the regional?

TB: Those ports are the important factor, in the sense that the interests of the parties even when preying on each other generally are the same, and it was usually against whatever established authority would restrict. It's something that keeps all of these guys together. I think what the sectarian dimension provides is another cohesiveness, and insofar as these ports do tend to be heavily Protestant, they create a kind of nobility of commerce—of goods, ideas, exploration. The regional aspect gets more emphasis than the sectarian; my concern is to reestablish the extent to which sectarianism could and did play a role.

MS: Maritime communities are by nature among the most cosmopolitan of a nation, and just by common sense there must have been all kinds of connections between English mariners, French mariners, Flemish mariners—recruiting crews, etc. Most ports involved in privateering are ports involved in Spanish commerce, and they continue to engage in illegal trade with Spain while engaged in raiding Spanish ports. Two dimensions: the monarchy when at war encourages piracy; when in peace it tries to rein it in, and of course that doesn't work. Add religion to this: it creates new alliances between English, French, and Dutch, also new relations among maritime communities—lots of privateers, the Earl of Leicester, Walsingham are great big investors, trading information about what must be happening, with the infusion of high-level organization and big capital, people on the Privy Council . . . it must give an added dimension to piracy.

TB: France was in a very poor position politically and made little headway against other European powers in staking out empire and protecting its sea-borne commerce.

MS: Another detail should be mentioned: French ports were controlled by regional admirals and the Admiral of Biscay and others were Huguenot: they controlled the ports, issued letters of marque, had the government apparatus to regulate these affairs.

AW: I wonder if I could follow up: Thomas Barnes remarks that something is holding these guys together—*what* was holding them together? It doesn't seem clear, it seems to imply an ideological component. What do these people see themselves as doing? Yes they see themselves as seizing ships, as making money, but people like Walsingham. . . .

TB: This is from Laudonnière: they've arrived, they meet a tall Indian who was a "hermaphrodite," Laudonnière orders trumpets to sound "so that we could assemble and give thanks to God for our happy arrival. We sang thanks to God to continue His holy grace and to give us aid in all our enterprises. When the prayers ended everyone began to take courage." Then having measured out a piece of ground in the form of a triangle (describes general construction, building activity). . . . There's no priest, no intermediary, on behalf of colonists and on behalf of the king; it wasn't disloyal to Charles—they *named* Fort Caroline after him—it was the glue that holds it together.

MS: But if you're someone like Walsingham or Burghley, you see wide-scale danger of poverty and idleness, hence the strategic point of view of the Protestant regime. Religious, economic, and maritime warfare were intertwined. Atwood is a good example in the literature. It's a curious combination: neo-chivalric code of adventure, but putting people to work is a theme of Christian humanist literature going back to Thomas More, now developed within the Protestant framework; the ideas are not purely Calvinist.

DT: The state has a role here but not necessarily the most important role. Huguenots, Catholics, maritime sea captains, all of them take the initiative here and help to shape the nature of New World settlement. But I wonder if the title of your paper is pointed—is it asking the question whether there could have been another way that New France operated? That's a good question, and if so, I wonder if you'd say more as to the answer. The first

French settlers were the Huguenots, Champlain, as you say, was far from a religious zealot. So is your point that French colonies could have had a better model than that eventually adopted? But you did touch on the fact that Québec became Jesuit, so what are the long-term consequences of the products of the Edict of Nantes settled in Québec.

TB: The Assistant Director was banging on my head to give my paper a title, so I came up with that goofy title, but there *is* a point. We tend to read back into New France's origins the enormously important role of Bishop François Laval, Vicar General, the first bishop of Québec. The Jesuits [were there] not just because they are the storm-troopers of Catholic orthodoxy, but because of their educational competence. Their dominance almost forces us to accept a peculiarly mono-ideological Canada, where in fact in the 17th century there was greater diversity than is immediately evident.

Q: If you could go back to this idea of the commerce of ideas, the ideals behind it—it seems like piracy all around: how does this come to an end? Does it have to be the end of the conquest, or does the end of the age of piracy and privateering reflect that community?

MS: It doesn't fully end until the 19th century; it declines before that. One of the things we tend to forget is that large seagoing navies are really an invention of the late 16th and 17th centuries; in the 16th century they don't exist. Royal fleets like the armada are mostly merchant ships with a nucleus of royal ships, which means crowns don't have the ability to enforce their laws on the sea. It's evident that on the Caribbean piracy declined by the 16th century because the Spanish were beginning to create a royal force. Pockets of piracy like the Antilles existed. There were periodic wars which gave a new boost to privateering—in 1620–30 the Spanish get clobbered by the Dutch on the seas, except Dunkerque has a field day raiding Dutch ships, which are everywhere at that time. It's a race between two forces, between privateers and royal forces, which is won by the 19th century.

TB: I would put the emergence of royal fleets even later. You mentioned Sir John Poulett, who kept the Duc de Soubise in his house two to three years before the fall of La Rochelle: Poulett's local political opponent said Poulett "was a good gaoler." In 1635 he would become a captain of the *Constant Reformation*, built under Good Queen Bess, and did nothing to engage the pirates, who were all over the Channel—England was technically at peace with Spain. *That's* the Royal Navy, the senior service that went to sea. Poulett was seasick the whole time. The story points out the enormous fluidity of the state fleets/merchant-ship structure. All merchant ships carried weaponry, fundamentally to defend themselves. All merchant companies that put ships to sea, provided their own fleet. Though there were very old laws of the sea, back to the 14th century, there's no state enforcement power.

MS: There's a trade-off of design between heavily armed ships and speed.

Q: When you were talking about the East Indies, what came first, ideology or interest, it reminded me of [?] kinds of situations: if you looked at the religion of Calvinism as ideology, it's very similar to the ideology of the 20th-century, of Marxist ideology—a [force?] they wouldn't have had otherwise. (It might be a false analogy.)

TB: It is a parallel; I wouldn't push it as far as an analogy. There are many varieties of Calvinism—John Whitgift the Archbishop of Canterbury was a Calvinist if you look at his approach to fundamental theological questions. So too was Henry Barrowe, who was hanged in 1593 for his heresy. Both were contemporaries, Protestants—Calvinists—and adherents of the Church of England.

II

SESSION II

Thomas G. Barnes introduced **Jean-Philippe Warren**, whose last name is pronounced in the English manner (he declares he is a Scot) regardless of Barnes's French wife's suspicions. Warren, the occupant of the Concordia Research Chair in Sociology at Concordia University, is very widely published. His interests include popular culture, Native peoples, social movements, the history of Canadian social sciences, and the Roman Catholic Church.

Jean-Philippe Warren

Québec: The Frontier Town and the French Empire

Professor Warren expressed his appreciation of the first two speakers' establishment of a broad context for viewing the encounter of the Old and the New Worlds; he announced his intention to continue exploring that encounter from another angle—that of the partnership between the French and the Native peoples.

The experience of the Native inhabitants of North America, long regarded by historians as mere pawns in the game between colonial powers, is undergoing a reevaluation. In particular Richard White, author of the seminal *The Middle Ground* (1990), describes a process of accommodation in which the indigenes assisted the newcomers in logistical, military, political, economical, and sociological ways, to “construct a common, mutually comprehensive world.” According to White, in the “cultural territory” of the Pays d'en Haut (the Great Lakes Area), Native peoples were for two centuries considered partners of the invading whites—despite their considerable confusion respecting the attitudes of the French.

The French colony at St. Lawrence River had great incentives for cultivating the Natives' good will. Lacking the knowledge, tools, and skills to grapple with the unforgiving climate, they were often on the brink of starvation. They depended on First Nation acceptance to survive amid potentially hostile Indian armies. They would also profit by skillful manipulation of trade networks already long established among the various Native groups. Among the many European explorers of the New World, the French experience in the northern realms of the continent was specific by reason of the geography and the climate: survival was difficult in the North, and the Natives' help was vitally necessary.

Québec began as a trading post: the fur trade comprised 80% of the colonial economy. Unlike the English colonies' focus on settlement, the French regarded settlers as a threat to commerce, and practiced a very subdued immigration policy. Hence, the French colony was always far less populous than the English ones—another enhancement to the French-Indian relationship, as the latter were much more apprehensive about the rapidly reproducing polities of New England than about meagerly populated New France. Indeed, they nicknamed the British “land eaters,” as they seemed capable of swallowing the

entire continent. The French, by contrast, adopted a “colonization without population” model (cf. Jaenen), relying heavily on the Indians’ *bon plaisir et bon vouloir*. Meanwhile, the Dutch had a fur-trade-oriented colony at Fort Nassau which acted as a kind of “ship on land,” permanently anchored on the Hudson River. Yet their relationship with the Indians who supplied them with furs was very different from that of the French. The Dutch were further protected, and the French presence imperiled, by the Mohawk warriors who protected the Dutch and their own interests in the fur trade. Several models of colonization prevailed in North America. The English model was based on indirect rule, with one Indian nation designated key intermediary between the Native population and the Crown. New France was a highly militarized royal colony; that no attempt was made to purchase land is explained by the King’s having already declared it his personal property, on which he magnanimously allowed the Natives residence and hunting rights. As long as they declared submission to the monarch and faith in Jesus Christ, they were considered full, and free, members of the nation. Among the three sectors of New French society—the officers, the missionaries, and the *coureurs des bois*, or fur traders—there appears to have been genuine appreciation of the Indian lifeway. The officers appreciated that the indigenes, like them, lived to hunt and fight wars, and left agriculture to their women. The Baron de Lahontan, for example, produced a popular memoir (1703) in which a Huron allegedly pities the servitude of the French male while championing his own independence.

The missionaries praised the Indians’ simplicity and selflessness and likened their oratorical skills to that of classical statesmen; they seemed not unlike early Christians. Indeed, medieval Catholicism, with its myriad of highly specific saints, was not far from animism, nor were the colorful ritual and emphasis on miraculous power wholly alien to Native practice. The *coureurs des bois* responded naturally to the independence bestowed on them by life in the New World, and many became “White Indians”—highly acclimatized settlers frequently married “à la mode de pays” (a scarcely surprising development in any case, given the gender imbalance of the colony).

The close relationship between the French and the Indians was much remarked by travelers, diplomats, and journalists from England, Germany, Belgium, and Italy. In 1766, after the fall of New France, General Thomas Gage wrote in a letter to William Johnson, the British Indian Superintendent, of the difference with which the Indians viewed the English and the French: “We are everywhere besieged by the land question,” he ruefully noted, whereas the French, who had purchased “not one acre of land,” had never had any such trouble; Gage acknowledged that the English “different plan” might be the source of the problem. Their focus on land acquisition translated into a strategy in which “Indianizing” themselves, as the French had done, was not a desirable tactic; there were no English “White Indians.”

Alexis de Tocqueville, traveling in the western United States, was addressed in French by a man he would have sworn was an Indian (the man was French-Canadian). “If my horse had talked to me,” wrote de Tocqueville, “I would not have been more astonished.” Had he known American history better, or reflected on the constant indigenization of the French Empire, he would not have been so surprised.

Q&A

DT: You began saying that French colonists had to cooperate just to survive. Obvious analogies there to Jamestown and Massachusetts, and to a certain extent to the New Netherlands. But in all of those, with the English certainly, once the English get past their initial difficulties they no longer feel the obligation to cooperate, whereas from what you're saying that very much is the case in French colonies. Is that perhaps partly a matter of chance, or is there some more fundamental reason underlying it?

J-P W: There is a common survival necessity for all settlers coming to North America, whether they be English or Dutch or even Spanish. In New Mexico there is a saying, "Four months of winter and eight months of hell." I think you can say the same for New France except it's the opposite—four months of summer and eight months of hell! But it was commonly acknowledged that without the support of Indians, the newcomers could not survive, because they would have died of hunger, or because they would have been killed. When you can practice agriculture on a large scale and develop large settlements, then it's easier to survive without the Native people's help. But agriculture could not be practiced as much in the northern part of North America, because winter was so long and rigorous. Furthermore, many people who came to New France were not there to settle, to practice agriculture, etc.—they only came to *trade*. Their intention was never to remain in the colony, to stay there, to marry there, and raise a family there, but simply to amass a small fortune, and then retire in Québec City or (for half of them) retire in France. If you look at what was happening on the Indian front, it's also interesting. The French wanted them to hunt more and more. They provided them with flour so they could hunt pelts without also having to hunt for food. This colonial or imperial process has not been underscored enough by most historians. The Frenchmen transformed the Indian way of life so profoundly after a few decades that without the help of Frenchmen some Indian tribes could no longer survive and would have literally died of hunger. So, in my opinion, there is a dual logic. A special and mutually beneficial relationship formed between the French and the Indians, but that dual relationship was not perfectly "balanced"; the Indian nations were profoundly affected by a historical process of acculturation, whereas the French nation was left relatively untouched by the Indian influence.

Q: Could you clarify: was it just a matter of geography, that in the north hunting was easier and in the south there was more agricultural land, or was it also a matter that the French and English societies were different?

J-P W: They were different to the extent that in one case (New England), some people were there to settle, and reside there, and form a new society; and in New France, most people were not there to practice agriculture but to barter and trade with the Indians. I think that's the chief difference between the two colonies. But the bare survival conditions were also susceptible to encourage a strong connection between the French and the Indians, as were other important factors.

RR: There's an article by C.E.S. (Ned) Franks, a long article, about the difference between the English and French approach and relations with Native peoples. His argument is that there was a different sensibility at bottom that all of these other things—demographic and geographical and economic—were laid on top of. He says that basically the French were willing to accept the Natives as people: if you pledged allegiance to the King and became a Catholic, you were a person. They even made them priests; there was a lot of intermarriage. Whereas his claim, which I think is very well argued, is that the English brought another whole model of encountering other people with them, and they

had a model of naked, uncouth, uncivilizable savages. And they brought that with them because they already had that attitude about the Irish.

TB: A lot of hands are up!

J-P W: I would agree with that argument, on condition that the concept of “culture” is situated within a certain social, political, and economic system. In my opinion, if you think that there is an essentially culturally based difference between the French and the English when it comes to colonizing the continent, you’re missing the point. The difference does not lie in the cultural “genes” of the French and the cultural “genes” of the English. I think culture played a role, but only to the extent that it was socially, economically, and politically structured.

Q: My questions are: Did you tell us about the role of the Abenakis, who territorially are in the territories of New France and New England, and how they negotiated that relationship?; and 2) What was role of *la morue*, the codfish trade between the [?] and Europe, in terms of its place in Native Canadian economic development?

J-P W: Those are two huge questions; I’ll try to answer the second question first, the one related to the cod economy. When you’re fishing cod you don’t need the Indians to help you with your fishing activities; in some cases you salt the fish on land, and encounter aboriginal peoples, but you don’t need the Indians’ help. You don’t spend the winter in the colony. You go back to France when the fishing season is over. Of course, very soon many fishermen were bartering pelts with the Indians. When Jacques Cartier came to Canada in 1534 to discover the “new land” in the name of the French King, he saw a group of Indians who wanted to barter with him. They had put their pelts on sticks. Cartier thought at first that they had come to kill him, and so he fired a few shots at them. They fled, but came back the following day, and he finally understood that they wanted to exchange pelts for whatever goods the French had to offer. Cartier reported that these Indian exchanged everything they had. When they disappeared into the woods, they were completely “naked”. So the Indians had already learned to trade with the fishermen who came to Canada before 1534. But this fishing activity didn’t have much impact on the Indian way of life. It was important enough that when New France was ceded to England in 1763 the French king negotiated to keep Saint-Pierre and Miquelon. But, important as it was to the French fishermen, it had no fundamental impact on the colonization of the New World.

Now, let me answer the other question. The Abenaki represent a superb example of the dynamics between English and Indians, on the one hand, and French and Indians, on the other hand. This is a group that did not feel greatly threatened by the French, first because very few Frenchmen decided to reside in Acadia in the seventeenth century; when they did, they occupied lands that were taken from the ocean, so to speak, through reclamation of land. They cultivated on territories that were not directly occupied by Indian bands. The Abenakis didn’t feel much threatened by their presence. Au contraire, most of them enjoyed the opportunity to exchange with the French. Although they considered them to be subjects of the French King, the French treated the Abenakis with much respect. When they negotiated with them they always said, “You are our equals, you are our allies”. Of course, in official French documents the French emissaries would write that these tribes were the French King’s subjects. But they never imposed their authority, and never asked anything that the Abenakis were unwilling to give. When Acadia was conquered, or acquired, by England, the French who beforehand had always insisted on the fact that

these Abenaki Indians were subjects of the French King, now insisted that they had *never* been their subjects, that they had always been free, and that they should never swear allegiance to the English King. There is an incredible gap between some official discourses and the actors' actual practice. In practice, the Abenakis never felt threatened by the French mode of occupation. They did very much oppose the English mode of tenure after Acadia was ceded to England.

MS: It's a fascinating paper, but the question it leaves in my mind is, how much should we attribute to the fact that beaver pelts are a commodity that is best harvested by Native hunters, how much to cultural differences? The English in the 16th and 17th century aren't talking yet about progress and democracy, but what they are talking about is improvement and civility. And "improvement" is a resonant term that applies to landscape and economic processes; it applies to people; it has a theological dimension, that God has given us the duty to improve the land and improve ourselves to make it more productive. And that is very prominent in English colonial literature, prominent in the discourse in Ireland, and in Ireland it has a very hard edge, because people who cooperate with improvement are welcomed as full-fledged human beings and treated as equals, but people who resist improvement, that is who cling to their culture when we know that ours is better, are being perverse and deserve what they get. And I'm just wondering, how much weight should we attribute to those attitudes in the different evolution of the two colonies, as opposed to the sort of ecological differences between Canada and Ireland?

J-P W: That is a huge question yet again. It depends on how you conceive the cultural differences. If you conceive the cultural differences as something which exist outside of social conditions, then I think the cultural differences play a very minor role. If you conceive those cultural differences within the greater economic and political complex, then I think these differences must be taken into account. One way to illustrate my point is to look at New Holland. When you look at New Holland, everything that you say about Protestantism and modernity (the work ethic, progress, etc.) could apply if it was not that the economy revolved around a trading post. Everything that the Dutch endeavored looked very much like the French endeavor—except for the fact that, firstly, the Dutch were surrounded by Indians who continued to play a middlemen role that the Hurons could no longer fulfill after they were almost completely destroyed, and, secondly, that the Dutch offered better manufactured products (which meant that the French had to venture deep into the continent to get pelts from Indians who had no real incentives to come to them). If you take everything into account, then you'll be able to identify some striking cultural differences. But if you look at culture in isolation, it doesn't say all that much about how people are going to behave when they're going to meet an Indian tribe.

CP: One interesting monkey wrench to throw into this discussion is to look at English trading on Hudson Bay, and their trading practices were enormously different from French trading practices. They were much more like the Dutch: they stayed on the coast, they traded through a hole in the wall basically. Another thing to throw in there is looking at the deerskin trade to the south, as compared to the beaver fur trade. So there's a lot of fur trading going on, a lot of commercial trade between a lot of aboriginal groups all over the continent. So it's a very complicated question; I don't think anybody's analyzed or sorted it out.

Q: I don't think you're intending this, but there's a certain sense when you're talking about Indians in your paper, they come across almost as "Undifferentiated Other." And clearly it depends on which tribe you're talking to, which tribe you're dealing with. And in fact your very dealing with those tribes, because of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, is changing the relationship between those tribes and other tribes, because there's a hierarchy of relationships developing depending on proximity and relationship between you and your French colony and surrounding Indians and the groups that are farther afield, so they will subsequently be mediating French interests farther afield, and setting up controversies and conflicts, etcetera, across places where once perhaps these groups got along or had mechanisms for dealing with conflicts. And I'm wondering what happens once you kind of inject that French virus locally, in systems of trade and political relationships between the different nations and tribes. It's just that we have, I think within a few decades into the 17th century we have a complete war, and the destruction of a large group of [Huron and Iroquois?].

J-P W: I have to confess a certain bias. In my paper I was only interested in the case of New France, and how New France was connected to other Indian tribes. This is why I didn't insist on the many differences that separate and distinguish the various nations populating North America. Some nations were sedentary and some were nomadic; some practice some form of agriculture and others are hunters-gatherers. Certainly if we were to try to draw a complete comparative picture, it would take more than thirty minutes. We would have to show how the dynamics played out according to whether settlers were confronted with the Huron, confronted with the Cree, confronted with the Petuns, etc. But I wanted to draw your attention to the fact that *all* Indian tribes, strangely enough, wherever they were located on the continent, saw a difference between England and France. Louisiana Indians could not be more different from Great Lakes Area Indians or the Saguenay Indians, and yet when you look at documents written in the 17th century and 18th centuries, they saw just as clearly as any other Indian nation that the English were doing something that the French were not. And so from the Indian viewpoint, it seems that there are indeed two archetypes of colonization (notwithstanding Spain, of course). In one case, the aboriginal groups could be friends with the colonizers; and in the other case, they worried about what the colonizers wanted to achieve. The Pontiac rebellion, for instance, began when France ceded New France to the English crown, because the aboriginal peoples quickly realized that the "land eaters" would soon invade their territory. They organized their rebellion even before the first settlers decided to invade the Great Lakes region. In brief, if I did not consider the differences amongst the Indians themselves, it has to do with the fact that all of them, whether living in the South or in the North, held a more or less common view about the French mode of colonization.

AT: I just want to mention an important exception to the picture, I mean the destruction of the Natchez people by the French in Louisiana has to be included in the story; so does the attempt to destroy the [?]. So the French were perfectly capable of being ruthless when [?].

J-P W: You are absolutely right. There's an imperial logic behind the French apparently tolerant rhetoric. They were not "nice" to the Indians because they were "nice" people. They were "nice" in a very hypocritical fashion: they wanted something and they needed the Indians to get it. Just a moment ago we were talking about the Abenakis. Once they were incorporated within the English realm, the French King no longer considered the

Abenakis as their previous submissive subjects but as independent people all along. One witnesses a complete reversal of the French discourse. Therefore, the middle ground, construed as a perfect equilibrium, devoid of any imperial interests, will always remain a naïve scholarly construction.

MP: I don't think White says anything like that, I mean his argument is much more complicated than that, grounded in the basic fact that the middle ground is only possible because of the Iroquois destruction, and then the Huron and the Ohio people, and the French are dealing with a scattered group of refugee Indians in the Great Lakes. . . .

CP: Well, it's not a refugee area at all, it's. . . .

TB: I'm going to lower the boom. Thank you very much!

III

Ethan Shagan (Professor of History and Director of the Center for British Studies, University of California, Berkeley) introduced **Arthur Williamson**, Professor of History at California State University Sacramento, author of *Apocalypse Then: Prophecy and the Making of the Modern World* and *Scottish National Consciousness in the Age of James VI*, and editor of *Shaping the Stuart World 1603–1714: The Atlantic Connection* and a critical edition of Hume's *De Unione Insulae Britannicae*.

Arthur Williamson

*Empire and Anti-Empire in the Scoto-Britannic Vision:
From Constantinople to Nova Scotia*

Professor Williamson confessed that after listening to the preceding offerings he felt tempted to employ the Monty Python cliché, “And now for something completely different!”; and enjoined the symposium to consider, perhaps heatedly, the idea that colonies were conceived by those who founded them as being *anti-imperial*. He also wished to question the motive for the debate on empire's shift to the west, inasmuch as empire and the debate on empire characteristically looked *east*, not west.

From a British perspective, the conflict with the Habsburg Iberian empire, the first genuinely global state in history, was the most dangerous war since 1066 and prior to 1939. The Scottish writer George Buchanan declared the empire “incompatible with political life,” and contrasted the Portuguese Empire unfavorably with the Scottish commonwealth; his ideal polis was that of Athens (as opposed to that of Rome), and his political vision one of Calvinist civil evangelism. Habsburg imperialism met as well with counterclaims from both France and England, with the latter envisioning a return of the true-faith-delivering Constantine (for all that no one imagined Elizabeth or James giving utterance to Philip's grandiose slogans “Iam illustrabit omnia” [“Now he brings light to the world”] and “Non Sufficit Orbis” [“The world is not enough”]). By the 1590s, in Britain and especially Scotland, anti-imperialism had evolved into “anti-Roman” apocalyptic vision, given voice in John Napier of Merchiston's *A Plane Discovery of the Whole Revelation of St. John*, which indicted Rome and Constantine as the agents of Christian corruption and of the transition from pagan persecution to papal persecution,

and reviled empire as the deadly enemy of the Christian faith. Similarly, the prominent educator and minister Andrew Melville looked to Anglo-Scottish union to turn the tide against the Iberian Empire—the Anti-Christ—and the Counter-Reformation, and explicitly identified the Roman Empire with the Roman Catholic Church. This equation is given lurid force in his poetry, appearing in references to Rome’s barbarous twin founders, Roman drinking practices’ debts to the Whore of Babylon, and the similarity between the papacy and the Romans who destroyed the Second Temple, even perhaps eliding the murder of Remus with the Crucifixion. Such sentiments linked Napier and Melville to 15th-century Jewish commentators’ construction of the papacy as a direct continuation of imperial Rome, and earned them denunciation as “Kabbalist” and “Talmudist”—appellations supported by the suggestion of David Hume, Melville’s associate, that the emerging British state adopt the lion of Judah as its symbol, along with the motto “I’m in the service of Judah.” For Hume, the new British state would be neither Augustan nor Constantinian, but Davidic, and the British Presbyterian Church grounded in “the plain and simple principles of the early Jewish church.”

Melville, Hume, and the poet Edmund Spenser were leading voices in the anti-imperialist, anti-Romanist discourse of the 1590s, with Spenser’s *The Faerie Queene* emerging as a powerfully anti-imperialist poem (Williamson adduced a series of close readings of the poem in support of this construct), and identifying Philip II with the Moors attacking Christendom in language evocative of *The Song of Roland*. Buchanan, a source for all three poets, anticipated their views in condemning Spanish behavior as worse than any indigenous barbarism, its “civilizing” impetus a fraud; Spenser, however, unlike the earlier writer, subscribed to the notion of a moral imperative impelling European expansion as part of an anti-imperial, apocalyptic program—liberating, rather than enslaving, as it proceeded. Treaties, rather than conquests, become the key, and Temperance the byword of this new agenda.

Andrew Melville’s unfinished *Gathelus* was conceived as a Scottish analogue to *The Faerie Queene*, but one based in a wholly different mythic tradition, adopting a Scoto-Iberian “imaginative groundplot” (Sir Philip Sidney’s term) in place of Spenser’s Anglo-Welsh one. In Melville’s work the Athenian prince Gathelus marries Scota, the daughter of the Egyptian pharaoh, founds a kingdom in Brigantium (subsequently Galicia), and fathers two sons, Hiber and Hemecus, iconic representations of two character/civilization types. The ruthless, aggressive, and violent Hiber becomes ruler of the Iberian Gaels, while the modest Hemecus sows peace and order as ruler of the Hibernian Gaels, inspiring other nations rather than conquering them.

Subsequently, Hume penned a tract (*De unione insulae Britannicae*) and a Latin pastoral (*Daphn’Amaryllis*) promoting a unified Britain’s conquest of the tyrannous papal and Turkish empires, replete with triumphal, leonine Judaic/Scottish emblems and mottos. Hume envisioned a British alliance with France and Germany and the settlement of *English* “coloniae” in “primitive” regions of the British Isles, specifically the Hebrides and Lochaber, in the furtherance of a genuinely “British” (i.e., non-tribal) society.

The amateur verses of the Jacobean courtier Sir William Alexander of Menstrie offer another example of British anti-imperialism, though they modulate from first championing the conquest of the Turkish empire and Constantinople to ultimately advocating the Scottish colonization of Canada. This transition owes something, perhaps, to the work of Buchanan, Napier, Melville, Spenser, and Hume, and the Scottish

deprecation generally of such colossal (Roman), not to mention bloody, undertakings as the posited Eastern enterprise. By contrast, Alexander's notional Nova Scotia is less an empire than the deliverance of a population *from* empire, his ideal colonial expansion a substitute for, rather than an extension of, universal empire. Contrary to the interpretation mandated by post-colonial theory, Spenser, the conservative Alexander, and the radical Scots espoused neither conquest, nor empire-building, nor the oppression of defenseless indigenes, but the ending of all empire, forever.

Ethan Shagan then introduced **David Trim**, Visiting Professor of History at Pacific Union College in Napa, Senior Lecturer in History at Newbold College in the United Kingdom, editor of *Development of Pluralism in Modern Britain and France* and *Amphibious Warfare 1000–1700: Commerce, State Formation and European Expansion*, and the author of *Cross, Crown, and Community: Religion, Government, and Culture in Early Modern England, 1400–1800*.

David Trim

The Dutch Republic and the 'Atlantic World,' 1609–74

The context for the Dutch creation of “Nieuw Nederland” in the Hudson River Valley both precedes Henry Hudson's 1609 voyage to America and lies far east of it—in Indonesia and points *en route*. This earlier context also helps to explain why Nieuw Nederland ceased to be Dutch in the 1670s, while Dutch New World colonies in the Caribbean and South America endured into the twentieth century.

Dutch naval and maritime-commercial power was largely responsible for the ability of the seven northernmost provinces of the Netherlands to revolt against the Spanish Monarchy—the first global superpower—and establish the *Vereenigde Nederlanden* (United Netherlands), or, as historians came to know it, the Dutch Republic. This extraordinary feat, begun in the second half of the 1560s but not officially completed until the Spanish monarchy's concession of independence in 1648, as well as the prosperity of the polity as a whole, was sponsored by Dutch maritime activity—both trade and warfare. In the early 16th century, when Antwerp, in Brabant, was the greatest port in the world, Dutch merchants, as subjects of the Habsburgs, had traded with the Spanish New World. During the Eighty Years' War maritime preeminence moved north to Holland and Zeeland, and particularly to Amsterdam, the largest city in Holland. Enmity with Habsburg Portugal and Spain blocked Dutch interests in Brazil, the East Indies, and the Indian Ocean littoral, but energetic exploration revealed a highly practicable route to the East Indies via the Cape of Good Hope, and the Dutch rapidly concluded that in this route lay not only the promise of great mercantile bounty but a huge potential strategic coup: control of Europe's trade with the East Indies. Realizing the necessity of a coordinated effort to achieve this aim, and responding to the vigorous lobbying of Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, Advocate of the States of Holland, trade companies and merchant groups united to form the *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (United East India Company), or VOC, in 1602.

Dutch maritime expansion into the Indian Ocean may not actively have diminished Luso-Spanish coffers, as the now-discredited theory of “mercantilism,” which posited a zero-

sum volume of global resources and commerce, had predicted it would, but it did bolster anti-Spanish war chests and, in demolishing the Portuguese maritime empire, paved the way to Portuguese rebellion against Habsburg rule. Moreover, as an outgrowth of these expansionary efforts, Dutch merchants and statesmen began to look with increased interest at West Africa and the Americas, their goals being, like the VOC's, profit and financing for the war with Spain. While some mariners investigated options in Guinea and coastal Brazil, the VOC commissioned the English mariner Henry Hudson to find a northwest passage to China; what he found was Newfoundland, Cape Cod, the Chesapeake River, and, after detailed exploration of the coast and adjacent waterways, the site of present-day Albany, on the Hudson River (which he named the Mauritius River, after Prince Maurice of Nassau). His advertisement of the location as affording expedient access to the interior, and hence to furs, attracted considerable Dutch interest, and the cause of American colonizing was widely championed, in particular by the merchant, diplomat, and propagandist Willem Usselinx. Usselinx advocated active settlement, not just transoceanic commerce, with an eye not only to subverting Spanish interests but to transplanting Dutch values and Reformed religion to the New World. Despite initial enthusiasm, however, colonizing efforts were slow to commence; for one thing, Oldenbarnevelt's negotiations for peace with Spain, in response to both countries' physical and financial exhaustion, had finally led in 1609 to the Twelve Years' Truce—a settlement unlikely to survive Dutch expansionist activity in the Americas. It was also at this time that division along confessional lines intensified in the Netherlands, with Arminians (or Remonstrants) opposing orthodox Calvinists (or Counter-Remonstrants). Oldenbarnevelt was nominally affiliated with the Remonstrant faction, and thus pro-peace and (because opposed to Amsterdam) against the creation of a West India Company. Unfortunately for Oldenbarnevelt these positions proved costly: loathed by the merchants for suppressing their interests, and held suspect for a politically motivated alliance with the Arminians who renounced the ideals of orthodox Calvinist theology, as well as for his apparent conciliation with the “anti-Christ” Spain, he fell from power and was executed in 1618 by the firmly anti-Spanish Prince Maurice.

Dutch exploration of the North American northeast continued, however, and in 1614 the States General offered a monopoly on trade between the 40th and 45th parallels, which the newly created New Netherland Company secured, having gone to the pains of causing a map of the region to be produced and claiming “New Netherland” (or, as Block's map had it, “Nova Belgica”) for the Dutch Republic. (The omission from its patent of the 38th through 40th parallels is what left the Delaware area open to later Swedish colonization.) In 1621 the States General issued a Charter creating the Dutch West India Company (WIC), which came to pioneer the Dutch slave trade and to be, despite the egalitarian prose of the Charter's Preamble, largely controlled by Holland and Zeeland merchants and the regents of Amsterdam. In 1624 the WIC landed thirty families on what is today Governor's Island in the New York Harbor; by the 1650s a colony of modest population and extensive territory existed, bordered by “Nova Anglia,” “Novæ Franciæ,” and “Nya Sverige.” Existence among the colonies reflected both home and present rivalries: New Netherlands crushed New Sweden out of existence in 1655, but was itself set on by the English, in an extension of the Anglo-Dutch Wars, and, at a moment when Britain and France were momentarily allies, came under British rule in 1674. While not part of New

England, Nieuw Nederland would ultimately become New York, while the upper Hudson Valley became the scene of conflict between the British and French Empires.

The Dutch presence in North America had been conceived of as a base for commercial exploitation and privateering, not as one of incipient colonization. Dutch imagination seems not to have been captured by the settlement of, or emigration to, the New World. When the WIC went bankrupt in 1674, its successor made no attempt to resuscitate New Netherland, concentrating on West Africa, South America, and the West Indies (the locus of slavery's infamous Triangular Trade) instead, and these colonies lasted until the end of the nineteenth century, while the North American continent was left to the English, the Spanish, and the French.

Q&A

MS: A hypothesis that might link the papers: I'm wondering here about the possibility of another model of empire, which is Athenian rather than Roman—a thalassocracy based on dominance of the sea and trade. There's a tract mentioned by Arthur earlier by John Dee, 1578, using Pericles as a kind of model. If that's a model, it would play in I think beautifully to what David is describing as Dutch strategy: could you confirm or falsify this?

AW: I think it's a good hypothesis, for a variety of reasons. If we're not going to talk about a Unitarian empire like Rome, then you're going to think in terms of Athens, a dominant state that guides other states. Instead of world empire or competing world empires, the Scots, French, English, and Dutch typically thought in terms of alternative models of governments, alternative models of state relations. It's significant that David used the model of Switzerland, so that you have confederations: by 1590s theology developed all over Europe to envision sacralized confederation: this is NOT Rome. You can compare papal Rome to imperial Rome if it serves your purpose—what the alternative is, is the League of Delos. But as we know from Themistocles that the League of Delos was no confederation at all, it was a tyranny of Athens and this was a point which contemporaries made about empires—so these things can be played more than one way.

Q: Would David Trim say more about the role of religion?

DT: There were bitter divisions over Remonstrants, Counter-Remonstrants, which gets bound up with the perception of Spain as Anti-Christ: Spain is the chief *prop* of Anti-Christ. You can therefore not compromise in war with Spain; you can't even make a truce so that you can fight better in twelve years' time. And the fact is that Oldenbarnevelt is probably not an Arminian, and he wants peace with Spain largely to give a respite; *but* the perception therefore is that he's not an orthodox Calvinist, and that he's actually also soft on the Anti-Christ, and soft on Catholicism. So for the reformed ministers, who produce a fair amount of the pamphlets for the proponents of the Dutch West India Company, part of the argument for doing this is that it's going to further the struggle for true religion, which for them is what the revolt against Spain is all about in any case. I think that fits in with the model I'm trying to argue, which is that you expand across the Atlantic as part of your attempt to win the war against Spain in the Low Countries, which is not only for political or commercial reasons, it's just as much for religious reasons.

J-P W: The first question is for Arthur: Do you think Alexander's decision to pick Nova Scotia had anything to do with Nova Scotia's original name, which was Acadia? And a question to David is: You mention that New Amsterdam was run by a charter company; so was New Sweden, and so was New France. Were they all the same, organizationally, or what were the differences? How were they run?

AW: I'm not sure; what he clearly does is try to create an analogue to Britain: there's New England, and above it's New Scotland. There's New Tweed, and all these analogues that he wants to create. As I indicated, what I find arresting about him, is how they're *defined*—we've got *boundaries*. Other people are talking about the stars: it's basically there to infinity; but we are contained, and that's what makes us, in the end, not Spain. As David Reed said, and I don't know if this will speak directly to your question but it might be something to reflect on, I think Reed is absolutely right: in the 1590s the British, and the Scots, and even the Dutch too, but the Scots and the English are not sure what kind of empire—what they do know is it's NOT Spain, it's got to be other than Spain: we are its negation, because it *is* Anti-Christ. The Spanish mission was underwritten by claims to "pure" blood and "clean" blood, that is, uncontaminated by that of the Jews or Moors. Here again British writers seek to negate these claims and thereby the Iberian imperial vision. It is very important, you can see this with Buchanan, you can see it with Knox, you can see it with Spenser, you can see it with Melville, they all want to show that the one thing the Spaniards don't have is "pure" blood. The point is to invert the ideology of the Last World Empire rather than laying claim to it. So it's this negation, which eventually becomes articulated in complicated ways. I don't know a great deal about Usselinckx, but what I have read is absolutely fascinating. If I'm not mistaken, David, isn't he opposed to slavery? He wants small farmers to move in—am I right about that?

DT: Yes, but I don't think he has quite the concept of slavery that we have; looking back, I don't think he quite grasps how slavery might develop. He wants to create an idyllic society that never existed in the Netherlands probably, but create it in the New World out of small land-owners.

TB: One point we haven't discussed and probably should have today is the differences in the way these colonies were financed. It is very clear that France never developed the type of organization, the genuine joint stock company, that was so important to the creation of the British Empire. It was left up too much to the rather fluid elements of getting together for a specific expedition, and that was still true in 1627. And that ain't good economics, market-wise or commercial-investment-wise.

DT: This comes back to Jean-Philippe's question: The Dutch, the East India Company and the West India Company are both *kind* of a joint stock company, but set up to reflect the Dutch federal structure, and so each of them has a number of chambers, which reflects also, it has to be said, the way the Dutch Admiralty is organized. So it's building on existing models. And different chambers can have greater influence, and within the West India Company, the Chamber of Amsterdam more or less runs it, at least at times. In the East India Company the influence seems to be a little more evenly spread out. So it's not directly comparable to the English East India Company or the Hudson's Bay Company. I don't know how the New France Company was structured, and all I know about the New Sweden Company is that it was actually founded by a Dutchman, who was unhappy and went to Sweden and started that there. So the joint stock model of England isn't that . . . the Dutch used something different, reflecting their own society.

MP: If I could just add a little coda to that, as far as big trading companies go, the joint stock companies worked fairly well for the English, but as far as a model used by the American colonies they were pretty disastrous, and in many cases it's not until they collapse and the Crown takes over that they stabilize.

DT: You wouldn't hold the Virginia companies up as a great model of how to. . . .

MP: Exactly, and they were terrible in Plymouth and terrible in Bermuda. . . .

DT: The Providence Company, too, in the 1630s. I think the East India Company and the West India Company to a lesser extent work despite not because of their financial structure.

ES: I wanted to ask Arthur, in terms of the boundedness question, and the sort of anti-Spanishness question, the tract that Malcolm was referring to, [Dee's *Britannicae Imperiae Limites?*], "The Boundaries of the British Empire" (the first usage of the term "British Empire" to my knowledge): the limits of the British Empire as Dee describes it include France, Germany, Sweden, Scotland and Ireland of course, but also Portugal and Spain via a 14th-century marriage treaty and thus the whole of the New World. So the question is, in what sense does propaganda convert into genuinely different constructions of empire, as policy moves forward in the 16th and 17th centuries?

AW: I'm not sure how typical Dee is of *anything*, but I like Dee, he's so outrageous. Let me give you Dee's counterpart in Scotland, with whom you may not be familiar: James Maxwell. James Maxwell is the ultimate Constantinian: basically, by taking the Bosphorus we are restoring the eastern Roman Empire, which is basically a British Empire; he never changes his mind on that. He doesn't say a whole lot about North America, but it's quite clear. Maxwell was deeply immersed into virtually all forms of Renaissance magic, in many ways the Scottish counterpart to Tommaso Campanella and John Dee. Maxwell, Dee, and others such as John Gordon and John Russell look to a restored Constantinian British Empire at the end of days. These are all establishment figures or at least seek to be, rather than being dissenters. Maxwell (like Alexander) becomes a Laudian. Laud refers to him as "Mountebank Maxwell," and dismisses him as crazy, but, like Dee and the others, he is promoting a British imperialism, quite the reverse of Napier, Melville, Hume, and Spenser. You need to be quite radical (like Napier and Melville) to say that Rome simply does not provide the model. Everyone uses examples from Roman experience, inevitably, but that's very different from claiming to be latter-day Romans. People might talk about the great moment where James accedes to the Crown, we can change Britain: this is a Machiavellian *occasione*. Or is it really *not* a Machiavellian moment, but a *Mosaic* moment. This kind of language is eminently available to these people. Yes, we'll find people who want to see Britain as a fifth monarchy. They certainly are there. But the people who are the most militant clearly do not. Buchanan talks at great length about being bounded; Buchanan thinks its impact is enormous: you don't want to be over-reaching. Spenser doesn't want to be over-reaching; Melville doesn't want to be over-reaching; they're very careful about that. John Dee. James Maxwell. They do seek a final world empire that will precede the return of Christ. This is the way these people think. So your point's well taken: not everyone is going to say you have to have boundaries.

DT: If I could just pick up on that too, the Dutch are very clear, especially in the East Indies, they're not trying to take territory; they make treaties with local people. The famous example, thought it's from much later, when the British go to China and refuse to

make the humiliating obeisance they're supposed to make; the Dutch had no problem with that: they did it a hundred years before. Because the Dutch want to succeed in their commercial empire. At times they're willing to use force brutally, they're happy to do that, but they're also quite willing to acknowledge bounds of existing native principalities, and to negotiate with them. Basically their chief interest is to make a profit, and if bounds help that then that's fine.

AW: To what extent do you find people using the language, part of it is tactically, part of it though is clearly ideological, that if we go to North America, we will liberate the North Americans, Amerindians, from Spanish tyranny? And there is some evidence that the Dutch genuinely expect this to happen. So that when you talk about empire, we're civilizing, but we're also liberating. So there are these conflicting strands within it, that never become fully separated I don't think, even after 1945, but you can see it with the Republican armies going into Scotland: they're going to liberate the Scots. And I don't think that's just cynical. I mean all language seeks to *propagate* and therefore is propaganda, but I think that's what the English republic seriously intended. There will be a radical, maybe a dependent, maybe an unequal league, but a radical Scotland will be created by Republican armies. It's not just a matter of forestalling Charles II. If I could get any comments on this? The Dutch apparently had some success, there were Calvinist Indians long after they had disappeared, much to the unhappiness of Father Vieira.

MS: I wonder if these distinctions don't begin to, if not collapse then become more ambiguous—Spenser, for example: on one level he's on the defensive, he's afraid of Spain, and on one level he absolutely wants to liberate the Irish. But he had a particular model of how he wants to liberate the Irish, which is that you turn them into English-style freeholders, and destroy the Irish system of landholding and the society headed by the Irish chieftains. What he sees is the tyrannical power that lets Irish lords raise troops among their subjects. And he's absolutely clear that realistically the way you've got to get rid of this power is conquer Ireland, kill a bunch of people in war, hang a bunch of people, and then once you've done that the ones who survive, who cooperate, can be liberated. So, below the level of rhetoric it's not altogether a benign thing. And conversely if you look at Spanish literature—they're liberating the natives, by doing away with the cannibalistic native religion, the Aztec Empire; and rhetorically at least, the Habsburg Empire, while it *is* an empire, is perfectly willing to recognize the separate liberties of different kingdoms that get absorbed within. . . . So it's not just a matter of imposing a single imperial structure on everyone.

DT: Don't tell that to the Dutch, though, Malcolm, because that didn't work out so well in the Netherlands

ES: Well, the problem is there's no Party of Tyranny in early modern Europe.

AW: There is a party for Final Empire and a party that rejects Final Empire. Empire is associated with hierarchies. Hierarchy and civic participation do not mix. As Malcolm has shown, we encounter a curious trajectory within anti-Spanish activity, running from the French to the Dutch to the English who only become the dominant force in 1580s. The concern surely isn't simply profitability, ripping off Iberian shipping. These people are religiously -- even ideologically -- motivated. Moreover, that trajectory replicates the adoption of the neologism, "patriot." The term first appears with the Huguenots during the 1570s and then is also adopted by the politiques. It crops up rarely and very late with the ligue. The term enters Dutch political discourse in

the last years of the decade. Initially in French ("un bon patriot" and "un bon citoyen"), but by 1580 we encounter warnings against "valsche Patrioten." Only in the mid 1580s do we encounter the term in English, "the good patriot." The political language seems to follow what Malcolm has described to us. So, empire and anti-empire carry contrasting politics. So far as I know the term is not used within the Hapsburg world. In fact, critics of Calvinism (whether in France, the Netherlands, or Britain) are often critics of the "patriot." Curiously enough, 20th-century Catholic nationalist historians have found themselves distressed by the Protestant associations with the early modern "patriot."

Consequently, the conflict about empire is a conflict about a whole series of values. Are we talking about protection and a society of subjects or participation and a society of citizens? What Buchanan is basically concerned with is what Loris Petris called a "civil evangelism." Redemption requires entry into civic life, becoming a citizen.

Finally I'm not sure how useful the simple category of violence actually is. Both imperialists and anti-imperialists, however benign their intentions, may turn to be enormously violent. More to the point, what do people see violence as achieving? And how is violence itself imagined? Is it a necessary evil? Or, is it imagined as somehow purifying and redeeming? We face the danger of collapsing into empty posture rather than serious analysis.

IV

Alan Taylor (Professor of History, University of California, Davis) introduced both of the upcoming speakers, **Carolyn Podruchny**, and **Mark Peterson**. Carolyn Podruchny is an Associate Professor of History at York University, the author of *Making the Voyageur World: Travelers and Traders in the North American Fur Trade*, and currently working on a project entitled "Ferocious Beasts and Miraculous Escapes: French-Canadian *Voyageur* Folktales Encounter Ojibwa and Cree Oral Traditions." **Mark Peterson**, an Associate Professor in the History Department of UC Berkeley, is the author of *The Price of Redemption: The Spiritual Economy of Puritan New England* and is currently working on "The City-State of Boston: The Rise and Fall of an Atlantic World 1630–1865."

Carolyn Podruchny

Dreaming of Pale Skin, Hairy Faces and Sharp Knives: Anishinaabe Narratives of Discovering the French and English

Samuel de Champlain first encountered Native Americans at war with each other. The Iroquois fought the Algonquin, and Champlain ultimately sided with the latter, and proceeded northward into the continent defining Canadian history forever. But what did the First People make of the Europeans? Daniel Richter has described this phenomenon as "facing east."

Professor Podruchny chose to focus on the "Anishinaabe"—also known as the Chippewa or Ojibwe, and closely related to the Odawa (or Ottawa). The ethnonym "Anishinaabe" is used by these Native Americans today. [A map was displayed depicting the Anishinaabe/Chippewa/Ojibwe territory, a large area directly north of the Great Lakes.]

Oral history has been disparaged as imprecise; in counterpoint to that perception, it seems apparent that a complex culture's ability to perpetuate its myths and legends in oral form bespeaks an extraordinary degree of technical achievement. More than that, such ability was critical to their survival. The validity of oral tradition as history is disputed, yet some feel that its contribution to the historical record should be respected.

Professor Podruchny cites the work of Peter MacLeod (who contrasts accounts of French traders with those of the indigenes who encountered them), Toby Morantz (contrasting English accounts with far less sanguine Cree versions), and Jennifer S. H. Brown, who points out that placing the differing perspectives side by side exposed the unlike memories of differing peoples, the "sounds of distant voices or gunfire or the ring of a steel axe, so different from the duller sound of a stone axe on wood."

Peter MacLeod recorded at least three instances of Anishabe medicine men from the 19th century dreaming of the arrival of "pale-skinned and hairy-faced strangers." The dreams are thought to correlate to 17th-century European arrivals.

The German explorer Johann Georg Kohl recorded in the 1850s a conversation with Peter Jones (Kahkewaquonaby), the son of a Welsh man and a Mississauga woman, who later became a Methodist minister and a Mississauga chief. Jones, too, experienced dreams presaging the arrival of white people, entailing striking coincidences with the actual details of the invasion. The Ojibwe/French/Anglo-American William Warren recounted a similar incidence of dreams corresponding in many specific respects to upcoming encounters with white people. In Anishinaabe culture dreaming was considered the primary means of communicating with spirits; hence, dream visions were regarded as highly valuable and informative.

Andrew J. Blackbird, or Mackawdebenessy, was of ruling lineage among the Odawa, and worked for the American government in the mid-19th century. He reported that an Ottawa prophet warned his people of "strange persons . . . far superior to any other . . . upon the earth." As has been described previously, an encounter with white people took place, in which technological revelations occurred.

Francis Assikinack, from Manitoulin Island, described the entry of French people into Canada, and the many things that were got from them. The French were called *Wamitikgoshe*, derived from *mitig*, a tree, and *wahsh*, a hole used by animals to deposit their provisions, referring to the newcomers' means of stashing their goods (i.e., in barrels).

In this summary of tales from 19th-century writers from various parts of the Great Lakes region dreams play a crucial role. Omushkego elder Louis Bird and the Ojibwe man Charlie George Owen (Omishoosh) both recounted encounter tales involving foreknowledge and the Europeans' presentation of guns and alcohol.

To conclude: in the era of Champlain, New France, and the French Colonial project, North America was home to a number of sophisticated indigenous societies, many of whom were keenly interested in the newcomers' technologies and materials, particularly those relating to the manipulation of wood. While thought-provoking encounters occurred (frequently entailing assistance rendered to hapless and ill-prepared Europeans), they may often have been brief and of little significance to the natives. Yet these first impressions of strange foreigners are remembered in Anishinaabe oral tradition, where they are primarily associated with wonder, mysticism, and oneiric premonition. Only

later, when subsequent generations of indigenous people were struggling with dispossession, poverty, and alcoholism, did such contacts assume a portentous nature.

Mark Peterson

Rumors of War and a “Free Mercate” in Boston: Imperial Competition and Co-operation among New France, New England, and New Netherlands in the 1640s

[Professor Peterson showed Champlain’s 1607 map the North American coast, from Massachusetts to Acadia, which, unlike many maps of the period, shows the region whole and undivided, rather than split up into the various colonial entities.]

The title of the talk refers to the relationships between the nascent colonies of different European powers by focusing in on the politics and commercial relationships between these powers and among the Indian peoples of the region, with whom they are in conflict and in cooperation at same time. Professor Peterson revealed that he had been taken captive as a teenager by William Faulkner and dwelt for a time in his Yoknapatawpha County; in Peterson’s work, Boston and New England are *his* Yoknapatawpha County, a “regional miniaturist” perspective very different in scope from the breadth displayed elsewhere in this conference. His focus is on Boston in the context of its Atlantic connections well into the 19th century.

The time frame in question, from 1643 to 1645, is a remarkable moment in Boston’s history. It was a time in which Boston drew back from the brink of extinction, expanded its control over the New England hinterland, worked out a satisfactory political order among the other New England colonies, with New Netherlands and with Acadia, and dealt with critical issues of English parliamentary control.

A critical thing to keep in mind about Northeastern America in this period is that the region was naturally integrated in interaction and trade—settlers were essentially competing to divide up a region that didn’t want to be divided. Despite the seemingly rigid boundaries of New England and New France, it was, especially from the 18th century on, a remarkably porous and integrated region.

[Shows the map previously displayed by David Trim of Nova Belgica and Anglia Nova, 1635]

The central fact to keep in mind about the founding of Boston is that in contrast to the vast claims granted most of the other colonies in the region, the strikingly small claim granted the Massachusetts Bay Company extended only from about 3 miles south of the Charles River to about 3 miles north of the Merrimack (there being of course no distinctive western boundary, given the absolute ignorance as to what lay beyond the Appalachians): a *tiny* slice of land. While other colonies had gigantic tracts of land, however, they had great difficulty peopling them; whereas Massachusetts—small potatoes land-wise—was a pretty big enterprise in terms of people. Within the course of a dozen years the Massachusetts Bay Company brought 18,000–20,000 people across the Atlantic, approximately 12,000 of whom settled in Massachusetts. So the general terms are reversed: most colonies have huge land tracts and few people; Massachusetts is the opposite. From the outset, therefore, it was realized that expansion beyond the patent would prove useful, if not necessary. So instead of New Netherlands controlling the immense territory from the Delaware River estuary to Narragansett Bay, it’s the

Massachusetts Bay colonists who, despite their limited patent, develop a series of strategies for moving into that area. Aware of Dutch success in wampum (shell) trade in Long Island Sound, the Massachusetts colonists start in the 1630s to contest Dutch dominance at Good Hope (later Hartford), in the process upsetting the control the Pequot Indians have over much of the trade and touching off the first major Indian War, from which, by virtue of alliance with the Narragansett Indians, Massachusetts emerged victorious with the Pequods and other natives as tributaries.

A severe problem for Massachusetts arose in 1639–40, when the outbreak of warfare in England and The Three Kingdoms discouraged further Puritans from leaving and the influx of economically substantial English immigrants suddenly stopped. With this cessation the Massachusetts economy effectively bottomed out, and prices of livestock and corn went literally to zero; with the colony's commodities now worthless and immigration at a standstill, the ships upon which Massachusetts depended for supplies had no reason to keep coming.

In response to this crisis, the merchant class and the entrepreneurially inclined government caused ships to be built and sent on voyages in search of a possible market; through luck they succeeded, finding in the recently developed West Indian colony a market for rudimentary commodities such as dried fish, salt meat, corn, and barrel staves. (A certain amount of “commercial thuggery” ensued: ships arrived with gold, silver, and slaves more liable to have been the result of seizure of Spanish cargoes than of transactions involving dried fish and salt meat.) In the course of these trading voyages, colonists beheld the burgeoning West Indian sugar industry and realized the enormous value of the slave trade; in 1644 *The Rainbow* made the first direct crossing from Massachusetts to the African coast, returning laden with slaves from Guinea, most of whom were sold in Barbados but a few brought back to Massachusetts.

In a brief window of time, therefore, the colony escaped ruin and solidified what would become a longstanding pattern of economic survival. A series of diplomatic crises now arose, involving the renegotiation of relations with New Netherlands and New France. Also in this period development took place in Connecticut and Long Island, the former entailing a “hiving off” from the Massachusetts colony typically ascribed to religious discontent in the colony, yet reflecting as well an opportunistic attempt to expand beyond Massachusetts authority in competition over the valuable Narragansett country in southwestern Rhode Island, with the further incentive of putting pressure on the Dutch. With the foundation of a colony just west of the Connecticut River in 1637–38 by a group of London merchants, the establishment of the Saybrook venture sponsored by Viscount Saye and Sele and Lord Brook, and the settlement by Massachusetts dissenters of the Rhode Island territory, the English presence in the Northeast was demonstrably *not* the unitary entity it is often presented as being. It would have been difficult at the time, given the highly competitive environment, to predict which colony would prove dominant in the end.

Due to its geographical proximity, it was the New Haven colony that gave New Netherlands the most trouble. Conflicts over land and water rights led to frequent violence between the two groups, and the New Haven colonists were consequently in favor of a united English effort to attack the Dutch and drive them out of their territories. Boston, intrigued by the possibility of engulfing the Dutch and turning them into tributaries, resisted this, and sent ships out to explore the Delaware River—“to explore

the limits of our colony,” as the exercise is intriguingly worded in colonial records. In 1643 Massachusetts led the way in organizing the United Colonies of New England, sometimes referred to as the New England Confederation, in response to Narragansett resistance to Bostonian encroachment on their territory and the implicit threat of another major Indian War. This organization included Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven, and was modeled on the United Provinces of The Netherlands. The dominant role accorded Massachusetts, in token of its larger contribution of manpower to the campaign, also provided it with a firmer base for negotiation with the Dutch, who had in the past suffered confusion as to whom it should be treating with. From this point forward it would be the governor of New Amsterdam and the governors of Massachusetts and of Boston who were to conduct negotiations and to bring a peaceable settlement to relations between New Netherlands and New England. Peter Stuyvesant, in his dealings with the New England Confederation, marks this shift in power and the new (Dutch-like) stability of the arrangement by referring to them as the “United *Provinces* of New England,” with Boston at the implicit helm. In 1652, when the First Anglo-Dutch War breaks out, Boston behaved with striking reluctance when asked to assist the arriving English fleet, and were only spared having to declare a position by the war’s coming to an end.

Meanwhile, New England leaders and Massachusetts governor John Winthrop in particular were called upon to deal with an evolving conflict in Acadia, in which the established authority of Lieutenant General Charles de LaTour underwent challenge from Richelieu’s Company of 100 in the person of Charles D’Aulnay. This rivalry, conducted between two competing forts, burst upon the New England scene when de LaTour sailed a 100-ton sloop carrying 140 soldiers up to Governor’s Island, where Governor Winthrop was engaged in a defenseless picnic with his family, and, far from perpetrating the anticipated massacre, appealed to Winthrop for aid in driving D’Aulnay out of region. Winthrop, speaking unilaterally for the entire Confederacy, declared that although he was not empowered formally to ally with de LaTour, he could establish a “free market,” whereby de LaTour would be free to hire as many ships and soldiers as he wished with which to attack D’Aulnay. (This gesture was, in part, symbolically justified by Winthrop’s notion that de LaTour was “probably a Rocheller.”) The attack was a disastrous failure, and Winthrop found himself besieged by an enraged D’Aulnay demanding recompense and had no choice but to agree to respect the latter’s authority, to seal which promise D’Aulnay was presented with a sedan chair that had been part of the booty brought to Massachusetts by the privateer Captain Hawkins, having previously been plucked from a Spanish ship on which it had been intended for the use of the wife of the Viceroy of New Spain: a potent symbol of colonial relations indeed.

The overall gist of Professor Peterson’s talk was that diplomatic negotiations in these regions were incredibly complicated, and colonial behavior resistant to uniform typification. Some of the English colonies were devoted to trade, others to settlement—in this early phase all options were open. The choices made by Massachusetts, to enable its extension into the region and its dominance over New England (to such extent that the Great Lakes French are to be found referring to the English as the “Bostonaises”), were among a number of diplomatic choices and negotiations that, surprisingly and partially by chance, pushed Boston to a position of dominance it had at the outset no right to expect.

Q&A:

DT: Carolyn highlighted folklore to access history—is that one of the chief sources for reconstructing aboriginal people’s experience?

CP: It’s certainly one of them. Scholars are increasingly integrating archaeological evidence, evidence of material culture, evidence of oral tradition, and also things that are recorded documentary evidence from different eras. There’s been a lot of discussion of how to use oral history, and to be sure to use it as carefully as possible, not winnowing out facts, or applying a positivist standard of truth to it. A lot of historians have been really hesitant to use it but we’re seeing it integrated more and more. One of my favorite books is Colin Calloway’s *One Vast Winter Count*, which is a new history of the American West to 1804. He does a beautiful job of incorporating evidence from oral traditions and ethnohistories and archaeology.

Q: What is it, “winter . . .”?

CP: “Winter count.” It’s a way of recording history: usually you take a skin and you record the passage of time in this particular manner, with images used to convey different events—harvests or moons or hunts, things like that. That’s another form of history that’s being incorporated by ethnohistorians now that are doing aboriginal history.

TB: Seven times in the 17th century, Acadie was fundamentally a Boston colony. In other words there was a special relationship there, which is present to this day by the way Nova Scotians use the term “Boston States” to mean the United States of America. There’s a lot to be uncovered here about the peculiar nature of Acadie: it was (and is) NOT Québec.

MP: Part of the chapter I’m working on now deals with the role Bostonians played in the Acadian removal—it’s a complex and tragic story of ethnic cleansing. It has been told well from the British point of view, but not from the Bostonians’, many of whom were forced to do this and were thoroughly horrified by it and forced to live with it for a long time. In revolutionary times many of the people involved in the Acadian removal were exiled in regions where they’d been sent to remove.

Many of Acadians who’d been removed wound up in Massachusetts—a small number of soldiers sent to remove Acadians only to find a few years later the Acadians relocated to their own home town.

Q: How extensive was trade between the Boston colony and Acadia?

MP: One of the agreements D’Aulnay comes to with Winthrop is that they’ll engage in this trade: even if England and France go to war, “We’ll continue doing this.” It’s not until 1689 in the glorious revolution and the overthrow of Edwin Andros in Massachusetts, which are parallel events, and then Massachusetts joins in King William’s wars against Louis XIV by funding its own expeditions, not so much against Acadia but essentially to get at the Québec colony, but that starts to come apart. There’s a brilliant little book about exactly this subject by Richard Johnson, called *John Nelson, Merchant Adventurer*, and he tells the story of this Bostonian, sort of, who is a member of this minor English aristocratic family, who had these sort of tenuous claims to vast territories in the region between New England and Acadia, and he comes to Boston to make good on these and eventually becomes a trader in this region, and the phrase he uses to describe all of his experiences after 1689 is that he was “crushed between two crowns”—that he got caught up in a conflict between the English and the French that starts in ’89

that he had no interest in himself; all *he* wanted to do was to keep facilitating the commercial relationship. But he can't do it anymore, after '89.

TB: *L'Acadie* became Boston's "Ireland" in this respect, a major source of livestock, beef. This role lasted until the final *conquête*, and only disappeared with the 1755 expulsion of the Acadians.

Q: I studied [Odawa?] for a while, and went to [?] Island—one of the most interesting places I've travelled in world. I went with an informant—she was delightful, but I don't remember her name; we went over to some of her relatives' house, they greeted us with one word, we sat in corner, we had tea, and the whole afternoon not one word was uttered: I've never experienced that pattern of cultural orientation before. When I was hearing your talk it struck me as very verbally accented; I wondered if you came across any incidents of nonverbal communication.

CP: I wonder what influence you might have had on the setting, or the politeness/intimidation about speaking to a stranger/white man from the US. In terms of silences, nonverbal communication, there is evidence in some groups—a language of gestures, but research hasn't been done that well—it's hard to capture. Possibly it was intimidation by outsiders based perhaps on previous bad experience.

Q: I talked about it with my teacher, and she said, "Oh, she likes you. . . ." In my life that's the only time I've experienced it, never with other Canadian native people.

CP: History's full of descriptions of these awkwardnesses. Susan Gray went up Berens River to do research, she set up appointments, was supposed to meet her interpreter, nobody meets her at the airport, she goes to ask where the interpreter is and is told, "Oh he's hunting in the bush—he'll be gone for three weeks." She feels sorry for herself, "Oh, I won't be able to do my dissertation, I'll never get a job. . . ." Eventually people took pity on her; they came and asked what she was doing there, she explains that she's a doctoral student interested in talking to people about their experience, and the more she talked people got to like her, and the more she talked to people the more she got to talk to people.

Julie Cruikshank writes about Yukon and Tlingit, in the panhandle of Alaska: she spent twenty years after 1974 trying to find out about the effect of building of Alaskan highway, came back twenty years later with Tlingit dream visions.

Q: The story you presented was so similar to one of mine, so widespread. . . . Why are dreams so important to arrival?

CP: The importance of dreams, it's just the way Algonquin speakers show they understood, the way the world's structured for themselves. The world is something you could perceive in limited way with your senses, but there were also parts of the world you couldn't perceive but you knew were there, inhabited by many many different spirits, or Manido, of different qualities, some more powerful than others. And the way you were able to navigate through life was by communicating with spirits and channeling power in certain ways—channeling power in order to have success. So every person wanted to have contact with a special spirit, a guardian spirit (I'm grossly oversimplifying and generalizing, please forgive me for that), you wanted to have a guardian spirit to guide you through life to be successful and happy. And a big part of the way you made contact with the spirit world was through dreaming. So dreaming was just hugely important. Oftentimes spirits were called "dreamed," "my dreamed"—my person I connect to in my dream world, that spirit who helps guide me. It's a key part of Anishinaabe cosmology

RR: Just on that, it's a way to legitimize, a way to frame a narrative, so they might have been dreaming or might not have been, but in order to tell a significant story, you probably had to start with a dream. And I just had to throw this in, about white skin, encountering white-skinned people: most of you probably know the wonderful African author Chinua Achebe; in his first book, *Things Fall Apart*, he talks about oral traditions among African people where he grew up, telling stories where there are these weird ugly people with white skin; and they concluded that they must have leprosy.

CP: Louis Bird has just published two books of his stories with the cooperation of other scholars, but he lays out a framework for kinds of stories that his community uses in order to frame and develop knowledge, and one of the genres is called quotation" stories, and they always begin with a specific quotation, and that's also part of that legitimizing.

DT: So are New England colonies actually borrowing the "United Colony" term from the Netherlands?

MP: There's nothing I've seen in records of the United Colony saying "Let's copy the Dutch," but so many people had so much experience of the Netherlands—served in the army, been in exile—and they have their own villages on the other end of Long Island. A part of it is that the language of what you call Boston and Massachusetts is very shifty; there's one instance of Parliament writing to the "kingdom of New England"; then it shifted to "country of New England."

Q: At various times Massachusetts Bay had a charter that gave it more self rule than other colonies: could that have been an incentive for expansion?

MP: The 1629 charter does afford an extraordinary degree of self rule. When the Connecticut and Saybrook and New Haven settlements are incorporated they are extra-territorial, they are going out there on their own; once they're settled they go back and try to set up charters. They have this very unclear legal quality,

TB: And the charters have bounds that are extremely loose and unconfining. The 1603 charter to de Monts covered all the territory from the 40th parallel (Lakehurst, New Jersey) to the 46th (Cape Tormentine, New Brunswick)—an enormous, totally unexplored and unoccupied by Europeans, tract.

MP: Whereas the Plymouth Company and Virginia had virtually the same boundaries.

Plenary Discussion

David Trim, Chair

We want to have an opportunity to discuss, try and put some things together, without keeping you too long from the wine! [A cork is heard popping in the back of the room]. I have a few thoughts to give out perhaps to give some shape to the final discussion. I'm keenly aware that as a historian of The Netherlands and England I don't really know much about this, so I'm going to put out a few hypotheses and if they're rubbish they can be shot down and I won't much mind.

The first takes me back to the first time I met Thomas Barnes, which was at the North American Conference on British Studies in 1997: a man was talking about Ireland and the British problem, what the British were doing in Ireland, and struggling to find a way to

put it into words, and Tom was sitting next to me and kept muttering away as Tom does of course, “Plantation! Plantation!”; and eventually the speaker said brightly, “Well, yes : it’s about plantation.” It took him a while but he got there. And I was struck by that listening today—the importance of plantation or the lack of it. This conference has been about looking at the broader context of the foundation of Québec, and looking at why do some colonies in America, in the Atlantic World, work and others don’t? So one thought that occurred to me is the difference between New France, the New Netherlands, and indeed originally Virginia, all founded with hopes of privateering or simply of trade, and the groups who came to settle for agricultural purposes, especially New England and to some extent Acadia. This produces as we’ve heard in several places quite different sorts of colonies. New Netherlands, New France work on a different basis really to New England, and perhaps that also produces different outcomes. Massachusetts, as we heard—a vast number of settlers, certainly in contrast to the humble Dutch colony on the Hudson, and as we know the English colonies attract many more settlers than New France, as well. So perhaps the one important aspect is that with some of the European colonies people are going there to *plant colonies*, to settle, as opposed to a model of simply going there to maintain trade outposts. I like Jean-Philippe Warren’s description of Fort Nassau as “a ship on land”—that really seems to sum it up perfectly. This seems to explain a number of things about the different trajectories of the European colonies. I’m glad that we had Carolyn Podruchny’s paper, which showed, and to some extent it was also there in Jean-Philippe Warren’s paper, the sense in which discovery was a two-way process: the Age of Discovery was an age of discovery for the original inhabitants of North America as much as for Europeans (and clearly confusion and misunderstanding cut both ways); also just getting a little bit of a sense of the power and wealth of some of the Native American societies; we hadn’t heard so much about that. I particularly was struck reading François Furstenberg’s article in the *American Historical Review* on the Appalachians as part of the Atlantic World, trying to integrate the original peoples of America into the idea of an Atlantic World—looking east, as a couple of our speakers talked about. And that does seem to be an important dimension.

Another area that we haven’t talked on so much perhaps would be Nova Scotia, the Scottish colony which then of course raises the prospect of Panama, also a Scottish settlement in the Atlantic World, and at least one book during the 300th anniversary of the union of Scotland and England last year suggested that there was so much investment by Scots in Panama, that when it collapsed it actually had a disastrous effect on the Scottish economy (rather like recent weeks [laughter]—except Panama isn’t to blame this time! Panama was the precursor of the housing market in other words . . .). His explanation is that Panama was the cause of Scotland having to unite with England. I’m not really persuaded by that but it’s an interesting hypothesis. We also could have talked more about Brazil, which I touched on briefly: one reason The Netherlands don’t put the effort into Nieuw Nederland is because they’ve got New Holland, which is their name for Brazil, and which it has to be said offers greater prospects for wealth than killing the beavers in the Hudson Valley.

Coming back to things which *did* emerge, I think perhaps more could have been said about the willingness to deploy violence: Scottish writers propose limits to empire, as we heard from Arthur, even the end of empire, but French and Dutch and English colonizers have mixed attitudes: on the one hand they talk about “liberating” the peoples of North

America from potential Catholic tyranny—you've got to save them from the Spanish, either roll the Spanish back or prevent the Spanish extending the missions. And I believe that that rhetoric was sometimes reality and was sincerely meant, and yet at other times there's a great willingness to use violent force, as was said. When people like the French and Dutch are trying to coexist peacefully it's not because they're nice people, it's because it's a good strategy to obtain their ends. And if we contrast that with what the Dutch in particular do elsewhere in the world I think that's brought out.

So two different approaches to colonies: that of genuine settlement and plantation as opposed to commercial outposts. Two different points of view on how to do it, one by cooperating and trading, negotiation—which is a common theme of recent historiography, but to set that against what *isn't* so popular in recent historiography, which is violence. Violent confrontation. Those two different strategies could coexist I think even within the same people.

So these are some of the themes that I have identified as emerging out of today's symposium. I thank all of the speakers for very rich papers—as a Europeanist, not a historian of America, I've learned a lot, and I hope that's been your experience as well. Those are my impressions of some of the themes. I guess my final question would be: Well, so Québec? What about it? What does all this actually tell us about the establishment of Québec, which took place 400 years ago. I have some thoughts on that but I'm sure some of you will as well.

(AW?): Can I go back to a question that Jean-Philippe and I discussed together, which is Andrew [?]'s observation about kinship. The French were very adept at making alliances with the Indians—they were very small in number and yet they had very effective alliances. And one of the reasons they were able to do that is that the Indians themselves adopted them into the tribe, they had adoption, they had kinship, and everything in the Indian world was based on some model of kinship, metaphoric or direct, fictive kinship or marriage or whatever it was. So you hear the terms, as Jean-Philippe said, at the first encounter they were called “cousins,” and after that “brothers,” and then “father.” And of course if you're the father, you have an obligation.

J-P W: It depends. What's fascinating about it is that if you're a “father” in French then your children must obey you, pay allegiance to their father. When the [officers?] come to New France they try to convince the Natives that the King of France is their father. And at first they tried to say no to that, but then, I think the exact date is 1672 or something, when one of the Indian chiefs comes to Québec, and says, “We now accept that you are our father.” What does this mean in an Indian culture? In an Indian culture, the biological father is supposed to bring food and cater to the needs of his children; the matrilineal uncle is the bearer of the education of his sister's children. And so there is a big misunderstanding about what it means to be a father. And even today, in 2008, we can follow that thread all across Canadian history. There is that misunderstanding, of [Indians?] coming to the Canadian government as they come to New France, acting that they behave like an Indian father does, which is to provide the basic necessities for his children. And what is interesting is that in New England, the local governments seemed always to refuse to consider the Indians their children. We don't see that metaphor in their correspondence. They call them their “brothers.” So it's interesting how family metaphors are revealing of a different approach, depending on if you are in New France or if you are [elsewhere].

DT: So what you're saying is that the French should have told the Indians that the King of France was their mother's brother.

J-P W: Absolutely.

DT: [to Carolyn Podruchny] Do you have a view on this?

CP: Well yes, I was going to say, that's totally for a matrilineal society, if you're speaking of Huron and Iroquois; it's not the same in Algonquian societies. But kinship still: with the father metaphor, you have a level of responsibility. I was always puzzled why the French in the Great Lakes region didn't go after the title of "grandfather."

[AW?]: But that constrained the French to a great extent, no matter whether it was matrilineal, patrilineal, or whatever it was if they entered that alliance based on the model of kinship, there was a reciprocity there. There may be some hierarchy but on the other hand there's reciprocity. And the [founder _____?] found himself in a very bad situation, where he had to lead a military expedition and he didn't want to and he wasn't able to, and the Chickasaw version is the same. So the French were successful by entering into that Indian model, which the English didn't do at all, at least not that I know of.

CP: I always wonder about the power of individuals—I've only gotten through the introduction of this gigantic new biography of Champlain by David Hackett Fischer. Champlain was someone who was just *open*, he saw immediately the utility of learning all those canoe routes, and I wonder how much the power of the individual kind of sets the model in New France.

?: I'd like to extend the discussion on "Mon Père," because the major figure in the community was the Catholic priest, who was referred to as "Mon Père," and he *does* provide many of the basic necessities or makes sure they get delivered.

J-P W: Absolutely; but what is interesting is that the Indian when it comes to Catholic religion insists a lot more on "Ma Mère," which is Ann, the mother Ann, and Ann became the [titanic? totemic?] symbol Catholicism in the Nation. And so the father figure was [mortalized?] and what [held sway instead was] a very maternal figure, and Ann became . . . even today, an immense pilgrimage to [?].

TB: Jean-Philippe, have you found anywhere use of the term "*parentes et alliances*," "parents and alliances" roughly? It is a legal term of course, but it is more than a term of art. In a French court in the 16th century, it was an absolute death blow to litigation where somehow or other the issues of kinship were involved. Have you ever found the use of this?

J-P W: If you read the treaties, a "father" and his "red children," and he promises that he will treat his red children exactly the same as his white children.

DT: European, especially aristocratic, societies are built very much around networks, partly based on kinship, and I think this is one of those facts that probably helps to make each society comprehensible to the other. So as in your wonderful example where the French aristocrats can go in and say, "Well, these people are just like us! They hunt, they fight, and they have kinship networks" (which was not in the quotation). But on the other hand what's also clear from the discussion is how a superficial similarity can hide certain differences. So perhaps by making an assumption about the other, how they're alike, they're also being misled.

If I can just go from networks back to Carolyn's question about going from networks to the role of individuals, that does seem to me to be a very interesting point, especially

when the colonizing is at such a low-key level as it is in the early 17th century, that individuals can perhaps be disproportionately important. And somebody said to me after my paper that “demography is destiny”—there just aren’t enough Dutch people that want to immigrate so that’s the end of that. I’d like to hold out a plea for the role of individuals in history, rather than being deterministic. Is there something to that, to Champlain, as you say his recognition? Peter Stuyvesant, the governor of New Amsterdam, seems really to make the colony work in the 1650s and early 1660s. Perhaps there are examples from Massachusetts as well, I don’t know.

MP: Well, in fact there are, and they aren’t only the Boston leaders, like John Winthrop, but as the colony spread out, and hived off, there are people like the Pynchon family, who become the dominant brokers of the entire Connecticut Valley region. And a lot of their importance can come both from their clientage and patronage in networks within the English colony, but also as brokers across the lines with Indians or as diplomats with competing colonies. When the Dutch developed the Covenant Chain with the Iroquois in I guess the 1650s, the takeover in the ‘60s by the English works in part because [?] stepped in and filled the role.

CP: A name—like Schuyler; it’s in Richter’s book *The Ordeal of the Longhouse*, and it’s the specific Dutch governor/trader, they created a term for him, a place in their community based on his name, they started calling the English Schuyler because that was the name of the Dutch guy.

DT: Are there any other examples that perhaps could be adduced? I guess John Smith in Jamestown.

MP: Except he wasn’t there that long—he disappears, he leaves.

DT: Well, there are other people who weren’t as good self-publicists who probably *were* influential.

MP: I had a different comment I wanted to make in response to your “Where is Québec” question. This conference has been framed as “Québec in the Atlantic World”—but one thought I had in listening to this is, it’s striking how really *isolated* Québec is, Québec City, and the interior part. We haven’t really talked very much about geography today, and the function of geography, but on the one hand the St. Lawrence River and the access it gives to the Great Lakes is a huge advantage to the French, and to the expansion of Québec and the colony, but it does serve to remove it from any easy access. [With New England] a much more interactive, fluid Atlantic World. And I think that is a situation that is enhanced by the power of the Iroquois Confederation south of the Great Lakes and just where the St. Lawrence connects to the Great Lakes. It meant that it was very difficult for the French to move out of that territory into North America, at least Eastern North America, and the Appalachians after that as well. That’s to me the striking difference between Acadia or Nova Scotia [intervening voices] And I don’t know whether it’s cause or effect, but the fact then that Québec, New France, under Richelieu and the 100 Associates, becomes very Catholic, very Jesuit, much more closed off in terms of the possibility of being in cultural and trading negotiations with the rest of the Atlantic, for which these issues are often much more fluid. It does have an interesting effect.

CP: I kind of disagree with you on the geography aspect, at least with the Iroquois—that’s the huge, dominating power at that time to shape what goes on in the Northeast, New France is always struggling with the Iroquois right up until the 1701 Treaty (Great

Peace).. But I don't think it's the geography. Just after the rapids of Montréal it is much easier to go up the Ottawa River than traveling along the St. Lawrence River to the Great Lakes. From the Ottawa River, they travel through Lake Nipissing, along the French River, and boom, you're in Lake Huron. The interior was very accessible
[General hub-bub]

J-P W: If you're going inwards, it's pretty easy to travel; if you want to go *outwards*, the correct harbor is closed [7?] months a year.

TB: You can go anywhere in North America *west* from Québec, Québec City or Montréal, any time of the year. But you can't go anywhere *east* of Québec for basically eight months of the year. And more than that, this is the area where you will get the worst kind of ongoing trade war, among the same nationals and between nationalities. When after the conquest of Acadia (1710), the French had to do something about the British, they built the citadel of Louisbourg, and that was *precisely* to keep everybody out of the *Rivière du Canada*, the St. Laurent, and its estuary. A very good idea of how vicious any kind of trade was in that area in the late 17th early 18th centuries is provided by Dale Miquelon's book *Dugard of Rouen*. You read that book and you think, "My God, it's amazing any of these people don't wind up speaking French . . . well I can't say that, because of course they do!"

?: The geographer Donald Wright [*The Atlantic World: A History, 1400–1888*] looked at that whole thing from a basically geographic point of view, and he was making that point—about how all of the other colonies were there on the coast itself, but Québec wasn't. And that gave them a clear shot, as you say, west and also south, and Louisiana was founded from Québec actually—they knew that they had another end of that whole river system. He said that it was the only colony that was colonized by a colony. And they went around, and they had a hard time finding the mouth of the Mississippi; but once they did, then of course they locked up the interior. I think Tom's point is you can go west quite easily, it's going east. . . . To an extent Québec is cut off.

DT: Mark has left but his point remains: it *is* cut off from the Atlantic. If one looks at Jamestown, it's sited on what's supposed to be a great inland waterway leading up the continent. That's the intention of the Hudson: had the Hudson flowed west, rather than north, back towards the Five Nations, then perhaps one can speculate that Dutch history would be different. A little geographic determinism goes a long way. So we're back to determinism. . . . But I think the geographic point is a good one and clearly Québec does have a different relation to the Atlantic World than do the Massachusetts colonies. And if think of the Triangular Trade, for example, Québec is never really part of that, whereas even New England, which is at the northernmost edge, is an integral part of that Triangular Trade, as it develops, and enriches it very considerably. Whereas New France is not, because though the St. Lawrence River is perhaps the *best* seaway leading into the heart of the continent, it's just so damn far north, that it's of limited value. So I think the relationship of Québec to the Atlantic World—we've problematized it! We're doing really well as we gallop through one last time!

Another area we didn't touch on very much is religion: I think apocalypticism, which Arthur touched on, does play a considerable role here. Clearly there's more room for discussion, but I'm going to call it to a close. So thank you very much, for everyone who came, everyone who spoke, and to the Canadian Studies Program for organizing the event. And now: wine.