

Canada, Humanitarian Intervention, and the “Responsibility to Protect”  
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Ida Sproul Room, International House  
UC Berkeley Campus

*Summary*  
by Stephen Pitcher

The conference began with the introduction of Professor Thomas G. Barnes, Co-Director of the Canadian Studies Program and Chair of the opening session, by Dr. Rita Ross, the Canadian Studies Program’s Assistant Director and Academic Coordinator. Dr. Barnes, despite a confessed bent for bellicosity (he created a course entitled “Make War, Not Love” at Berkeley), was enthusiastic about the movement to mitigate war’s effects, and felt that such endeavors lay squarely “within the Canadian idiom.” Before proceeding further, he praised Dr. Ross’s doughty stewardship of the Program, whose other principals (himself and Dr. Nelson Graburn) were often far afield. He then welcomed Canadian Consul General Stewart Beck to the proceedings, and, after a brief introduction of its author, began to read David J. B. Trim’s paper, Dr. Trim having been prevented from attending the conference by illness.

### *Session I*

*Canada, the International Community and the Origins of “Responsibility to Protect”*

**David J. B. Trim**

The protection of populations from human rights violations and from genocidal depredation is a task of daunting complexity. Who is responsible for the provision of such protection, and what are the resources available to them? To what extent can the moral imperatives of global society be allowed to encroach upon the sovereignty of individual states? What diplomatic means exist to assuage the justifiable fears of lesser nations that the intervention of greater powers in their domestic affairs will result, as it has in the past, in long-term occupation with an exploitative agenda? The urge to shield one’s fellow man from harm—seemingly so simple and direct—in fact gives rise to a host of ethical, moral, legal, diplomatic, and logistical dilemmas.

The doctrine of “responsibility to protect” (R2P) reflects and encodes recent approaches to this problematic situation, as well as bearing intriguing witness to Canada’s evolving position in the international community. The articulation of policies toward R2P by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005 and the Security Council in 2006, the creation of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000, and the searing challenge to the international community issued by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his 1999 article in *The Economist*, to avoid “future Kosovos and future Rwandas,” arose in response to the hideous humanitarian crises of the 1990s and the long history of poorly coordinated attempts to contain such emergencies. Canada’s prominent role in bringing ICISS about, and in guiding its progress, proceed, in part, from her desire to play a significant role in international policy—one that is in keeping with the influence and honor she won in World Wars I and II, yet proportionate to the modest dimensions of her population, industrial base, and military might. The ICISS, and the concept of “responsibility to protect” generally, would seem as well to manifest some of Canada’s

more salient and positive values: emphatic multilateralism (never of a specifically pacifistic type), overt moral consciousness, and the desire to promote human rights and liberal democratic values globally.

Dr. Trim describes Canada's seminal involvement in the creation of ICISS and in the original *Responsibility to Protect Report* as a manifestation of Lester Pearson's philosophy of a *national* policy dedicated to an *international* peace. As a result of this original and ongoing involvement, R2P's priorities and procedures are pervaded with a certain 'Canadianness.'

Dr. Barnes commented that it was "nice to hear a historian defending history." Dr. Trim not being present to field questions, it was proposed that the conference adjourn, reserving questions for the final Plenary Discussion.

## *Session II*

Chair **Roxana Altholz**, a former legal advisor in Kosovo, praised the depth and analysis of Dr. Trim's work, and introduced Session II as one comprising two voices and two quite different perspectives.

*The Canadian Forces in the 1990s: The Foundation of a Force for Good?*

**Lt. Col. Michael A. Rostek**

Lt. Col. Rostek's brief for this conference was explicitly to use the Canadian Forces experience in the 1990s to provide a context for the development of the R2P movement; accordingly, his language is that of *humanitarian intervention*—that period's formulation—rather than of a "right to protect," and the perspective employed that of a warfighter, not that of a peacekeeper. He supplied a caveat that his views were not those of the Canadian government.

The 1990s were a traumatic decade for the Canadian Forces, described as a "decade of darkness," a "long dark night of the spirit"—an "interregnum" of which the outcome was a baffling unknown. The cessation of the Cold War spawned a new security debate with a specific focus on *human*, rather than *statal*, security. In response to this new scenario, and to more recent events illustrative of Mary Kaldor's distinction between "old" wars and "new" ones (as, for instance, in East Timor and Somalia), a Canadian foreign policy paper was issued in 1995, articulating three objectives: the promotion of prosperity and employment; the protection of security within a stable global framework; and projection of Canadian values and cultures. The paper's emphatic inclusion of "*human security*" within "security" constituted a significant innovation.

Directly preceding this document was the publication of the 1994 Defence White Paper, whose uncharacteristic omission of a separate chapter on NATO reflected the perception that NATO was creating commitments beyond those the government wished to support. The Paper spoke to a move away from NATO and toward the UN and the arena of collective security. The perception "from the inside" (within the military) was that the new liberal government was attempting a major shift in policy and deployment, though whether for altruistic or budgetary reasons was unknown.

The centerpiece of the White Paper was the Multipurpose Combat Capable Force, a source of debate with the military, who continued to support a general-purpose warfighting capability. Both the White Paper and the independent think tank Canada 21, whose members included a former Chief of Defence Staff, acknowledged the need for more resources, though seemingly motivated by opposite ends of the policy spectrum. Resource cuts were, indeed, the biggest issue in the 1990s; their effects are still being felt. Ramifications of the cuts included zero recruitment; faster—possibly overhasty—promotion; the official injunction to “do more with less”; and the slowing of operational tempo.

Personally involved in training forces for the Balkans conflict, Rostek spoke of the confusion engendered by the command to train officers in peace support only, and of the concern with losing a warfighting edge in a situation where lives were continually put on the line, soldiers taken hostage, etc. As one officer described it, “This is not peace monitoring; this is war monitoring.” Idealized objectives aside, as subsequent events in Rwanda and East Timor continued to demonstrate, peacekeeping “does get messy.” Through it all there was the confusion, the crippling absence of funds, and the pervasive sense of harm done to Canada’s international reputation by its being seen as a state that had done “just barely enough.”

Arising from the ashes of this bitter time was the military identification with the notion of “Force for Good,” whose principles include the establishment of individual humans as the ultimate units; the provision of a demonstrable reason for, and the application of appropriate force to, every conflict undertaken; and the deployment of soldiers to save the other individuals, whatever their nationality, rather than in pursuit of their own state’s interests. In effect, this doctrine supplies the guidelines for the military operationalization of R2P. Rostek avers that the Canadian Forces would never have arrived at this point without going through the 1990s; as Disraeli put it, “There is no education like adversity.”

**Roxana Altholz** thanked Lt. Col. Rostek for the insight into what was happening to the Canadian defence forces while policymakers were discussing R2P, and into the institutional and even emotional transformation that was occurring within the forces because of the events of the 1990s. She then introduced Professor **Robert Nalbandov**.

*Somalia: When Force Fails*  
**Robert Nalbandov**

The background to the conflict in Somalia is thickly sown with dichotomies: a shared ethnicity versus clan-based cleavages; self-determination versus a move toward integrated statehood; historical colonial and post-colonial interest versus current international indifference. The latter was dispelled by the event’s staggering toll of atrocities and human rights violations; the resulting intervention became the first test of post-Cold War institutional multilateralism. While a “peace-centric” approach to the analysis of intervention would measure the duration (if any) of peace following intervention, Nalbandov proposed rather to measure the rate of actual fulfillment of goals and agendas set by those intervening—a “goal-oriented” approach. The latter embraces the variety of motives attending third-party intervention, and the posture of domestic entities

respecting the conflict. A peace-centric approach, by contrast, would accord high ratings to a conflict resolution in which a group supported by the intervening force was utterly vanquished, resulting in lasting peace—and the total failure of the force’s objectives.

At the point when the death rate in Somalia could no longer be countenanced, the UN Security Council’s Resolution 733 appointed Mohammed Sahnoun to oversee humanitarian activities and to negotiate with the combatants. The U.S. National Security Council, meanwhile, initiated the humanitarian intervention action “Operation Restore Hope.” This bifurcated, yet simultaneous approach—with the UN’s UNISOM handling political and humanitarian issues and the NSC’s UNITAF securing major population centers—presented problems from the start. For one thing, the UN’s neutrality was clearly compromised by its association with UNITAF. Meanwhile, domestic leaders Mohammed Farrah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Muhammad viewed developments in the country exclusively through the lens of their rivalry. Of the many conferences convened to address the crisis, the ones held in January and March of 1993 in Addis Ababa were the most important. They resulted in an agreement calling for a two-year disarmament and the creation of central and regional administrative units to supervise the reconciliation and rebuilding of the country. A new UN resolution, UNOSOM II, responding to the perceived potential of the moment, mandated expanded peace-building activities as well as economic, social, and political assistance—an initiative Nalbandov termed “overly ambitious.” Inimical to such attempts were the (overlooked) pluralistic nature of the Somalian conflict, and the extent to which such “post-conflict” activities were in fact being carried out amid active war, in a “failed state” where routine civil life, government, and infrastructure were essentially extinct.

In fact, reconciliation and reintegration efforts, for a variety of historical, economic, and cultural reasons, were largely against the interests of the warlords, and served to exacerbate friction between the peacekeepers and their notional clientele. In June 1993, as a result of faulty communications, two dozen Pakistani peacekeepers were ambushed and killed; Aideed was blamed and became “target number one” both of a new UNOSOM II find-and-capture task force and of the newly ordained and decidedly non-pacific U.S. “Operation Gothic Serpent.” UNOSOM II’s annihilation of some fifty clan leaders caused the Somali public to erupt in anti-American rage in July 1993. Active hostilities in what was now discernibly an American-Somali conflict escalated with numerous fatalities on both sides, until the October 1993 “Battle for Moqdishu,” whose aftermath, involving the mutilation of U.S. soldiers, was viewed around the world, drastically altering international opinion of the intervention. U.S. and UN forces withdrew shortly afterward from a still war-torn Somalia.

A goal-oriented evaluation and comparison of the Somalian interventions is facilitated by numerous published mandates rendering the operative goals and agendas of the procedures transparent, and by the controlling factor of its having been the same third party intervening both times. Causes for the success of UNOSOM I and the failure of UNOSOM II derive alike from a dual set of factors: those pertaining to the conflict environment, and those involving the subjective schema of the interveners. UNOSOM I’s achievements—separating combatants and equipping the communities for future sustained cooperation—were the result of careful limitation of scope, particularly in terms of engaging with domestic power rivalry. Its forbearance respecting the latter won it acceptance among the warring parties, without which its efforts would have been fruitless. (Its limited mandate, of course, also made it unable to enforce any peacekeeping agreements that

were reached.) Another factor favoring UNOSOM I was that its peacekeeping efforts were conducted at a time when active hostilities had largely ceased: it was not, like UNOSOM II, attempting to keep a peace that did not exist. The active engagement of UNOSOM II with Somali belligerents fueled inter-clan strife, rendering efforts at pacification useless. Nalbandov feels also that the UN's heavy reliance on one primary contributor—the U.S.—amounted to a structural flaw. Uneven contribution of resources resulted in the distribution of uneven, and often inappropriate, materiel.

UNOSOM II neither enforced the widespread protection of human rights, in the general spirit of the UN Charter, nor succeeded in the accomplishment of its specific agenda items. The UN's emphasis on its neutrality was, he asserts, counterproductive; the power to punish breakers of the peace and a firm commitment to the use of force—and the resources appropriate to such a stance—would have proved more efficient in saving lives.

Policymakers, diplomats, and academics are idealistic: we think that peace is better than war—it is what we as people *deserve*—and there is a consequent enthusiasm for the fancy, colorfully packaged Security Council or UN peacemaking charters or resolutions. But when the wrapping comes off the fancy package, “all we got is a refrigerator.” Combining the peace-centric and the goal-oriented approaches toward conflict might help to bridge the gap between idealism and realism, with peace among third parties being the primary goal, supported by early engagement in the conflict and wholehearted commitment to the force necessary to pursue that goal.

## Q&A

**Jeremy Kinsman:** I was a foreign affairs official and very involved in the decades Michael is talking about. I enjoyed your presentation very much; it makes a lot of sense—scholarly but realist, and that's a rare specimen. “Decade of darkness”: you know, it was a decade of *light* for Canada in an awful lot of ways. In 1993, if I remember right, our deficit was 44 billion dollars; within four years (Lloyd [Axworthy], if I'm right), we were in surplus, and we stayed in surplus for the next eleven years. We went from being the G7 country with the highest debt/GDP ratio, to being the G7 country with the lowest debt/GDP ratio. In consequence, our debt load was enormously reduced. It is true that the Canadian Forces were hammered; but Lloyd Axworthy, whose former job was with the Ministry for Social Services—I can remember that there wasn't a cabinet meeting where you [Axworthy] were not being hammered every bit as much as the Canadian Forces. And polling showed that that's what Canadians wanted. So, I guess my statement is just to put it into perspective. Because one of the reasons right now in Kingston, Ontario, and where I live in British Columbia, we are not going through what Stockton, California is going through, is because of those efforts over twelve years. I understand the morale issues; I think your treatment of transition to combat-ready forces is absolutely wonderful: don't change a word of it. But get rid of that “decade of darkness.”

Second question: On Serbia. You talked about your experience, when guys were in the bunker, and they had lousy kits. One of the problems was, the Department of National Defence refused to identify an aggressor in the Balkans war. It wasn't until Tony Blair came in, and these guys prepped him, that we finally concluded that Serbia was an aggressor, and this wasn't just “making

nice” among a whole bunch of equally responsible people. So I think there was a failure of analysis and a failure of choice on the part of the civilian people in the Department of National Defence. I’m sorry to say this, but I just want people to understand that we weren’t *totally* nuts in those days; we were only *partly* nuts.

**Rostek:** Thank you for the comment. I actually have in my notes to make sure that I point out that the cuts to the Defence budget were not only to Defence, and it was an oversight on my part not to have mentioned that. Today, when I talked to my level of people in Foreign Affairs today, they still claim that, “Okay, Defence, you’ve now been given a good chunk of your money back; we’re still struggling.” I think that that is really evident. We’re working this new sort of idea—you may have heard of it—called the “Comprehensive Approach,” where we’re trying to get more interaction *across* government, rather than up and down in the stovepipes, and we’re finding that we have this tremendous capacity now to plan and do this for the other departments. Particularly CETA and Foreign Affairs don’t have the capacity, so we tend to inundate them at times. But when I do get to pigeon-hole guys and ladies and talk to them about this sort of idea, they have one person deep. I haven’t looked at it in any degree of detail, but my sense is that with the funding levels where Foreign Affairs were cut, hasn’t come back the same as the military has come back. The “decade of darkness”: NOT my terminology. That was articulated by General Hillier, and I think he only articulated it once or twice, and then it ended. What I was trying to portray was just that we had this raising operational tempo, and we were doing our part of erasing the deficit; and the two were incompatible. In terms of identifying who the aggressor was, I can’t comment on that, I’m sorry. I know there were lots of stories, lots of anecdotes, about guys getting in trouble and being court-martialed because they were on this side of the line, drinking and talking, when they should have been on the other side, and these sorts of debates went on. There were a couple of high-profile court martials of individuals. I can’t comment specifically on that, but I’ll take it as a point for sure.

**Q:** My name’s Jamie Rowan; I’m at Berkeley Law School. I’m two days back from Sarajevo, actually, and I’m incredibly grateful for your presentation, which is basically, I think, saying: “Look at the reality of this doctrine.” My question is, do you go far enough in your critiques? It’s not a matter of why, in Somalia, it seems to me, in the first instance we had short-term goals, and in the second we had longer. It seems more that we should really press and say, “What do we *mean* when we say ‘the responsibility to protect,’ and how can we actually operationalize that, and what are the limitations of creating a cosmopolitan military, or creating a peace mission that tries to set long-term goals?” When we start to train people to do everything, are we really training them to do nothing effectively. Just to point out what’s going on in Sarajevo, in the intervention that people did, while the Bosnia population is incredibly grateful that the war stopped fifteen years out, the intervention has enshrined ethnic difference and created a completely untenable government situation that people are now saying will inevitably dissolve, and we’re just hoping it doesn’t go into war because people are too tired to fight. But the intervention itself was highly problematic even if it stopped the war. So when we think about these long-term peace-building things, who is going to define that? That’s really my question. And how does that undermine our ability to operationalize the responsibility to protect?

**Nalbandov:** I think that this is a fundamental question of the international community. In answering this question we may run at some point into the reconstruction of international order.

Because the point here is that peace and the responsibility to protect are in a sense a public good: everybody wants to enjoy it, but nobody wants to pay for it. So I think that a point of departure is to start thinking how to make it a *private* good—how to share the responsibility to protect among the members of the international system. Notwithstanding their size, or notwithstanding their contributions to the international system, basically to make everybody responsible, on a state level. That would make the state leaders, policymakers, and the military act with the ultimate goal of protecting the rights of the people. Who should define it, who should define the goals? I think there's another problem, as in the famous fable of a little guy shouting in his village "Fire! Fire!" and when people come to extinguish this fire there was no fire at all; and when there was eventually fire in the village, nobody came. This is the point of concern—shall international communities react to every possible [visionary? = capable of being envisioned?] or future collapse of society, future genocide, or who should define that situation on the ground: Can lead to genocide; can lead to large abuses of human populations. Unfortunately, I don't have the answer to that. I think that making the responsibility to protect a private good would be the first step in this journey.

**Rostek:** As you know, and I'm sure everybody in this room knows, there are no easy solutions to this. But while I would say you're right in most of your comments, I'm sort of a glass-half-full type of a guy, and I look at where we've come in the last fifteen years, and how much progress we've made, and that this is not going to be any short-term solution to this for sure. My concerns come particularly from the military component, and I'm encouraged when I interview a young lieutenant who wears one medal—Afghanistan—on his chest, and say "How do you get from this all-out warfighting in a valley, where you're being attacked, and you're breaking all the doctrinal rules, how do you get to the next stage, this idea of the three-block war, where you're actually in there and you're doing a very different task?" And he explained to me, without the blink of an eye, "I have no issue with that. I have ROE [Rules of Engagement] to set the framework for me, to do that." I remember when ROE first came out in the nineties, and soldiers were having a hard time with that issue, and they were taping them on the butts of their rifles, they were putting them on the backs of their ID cards so they were constantly reminded. These guys now, through education and through training, I think we've actually come some way. This idea of cosmopolitan military—don't get me wrong: I'm not saying that that exists. But what I do agree with, with the cosmopolitan authors, and the position they take, is that the Canadian Forces—and I don't mean this in an arrogant way—have actually shown some tendencies in that direction, based on what we've been through in the nineties. And, yes, if you're going to operationalize this, the military aspect of R2P, I actually can see how that will evolve into a military role through the Canadian Forces, at least *for* the Canadian Forces. And I'm encouraged by what I see and who I talk to in Afghanistan. My job is, I'm a concept developer for the [army?] so I have to look to the future. I look at these things—I look at where we've been, I look at where we're going, I'm a glass-half-full sort of guy, and I say, "Yes, I see a future here, but it becomes increasingly complex"; but I'm kind of inspired by the soldiers I interview these days. I know it's not really an answer, but that's how I see it.

**Thomas Barnes:** An observation and then a question that follows—addressed to both of you, actually. The observation is that armies are composed of people who share an ethos of some sort. I think, Colonel, maybe what you were talking about was how the Canadian Army found a new ethos for itself in the terms of the 1990s and certainly in this century in Afghanistan. That raises

the question of, “If we do not need the ultimate, not to be lightly used, only as a last resort in R2P, which is military force, should we, *can* we, what would be the effects of relying upon a United Nations army?” I’m talking army; I follow Lewis MacKenzie’s point, that peacekeepers basically have to be warmakers, when bad comes to worse. So what do either of you, or both of you, think about a UN army to do this kind of work?

**Rostek:** Of course the debate is alive and well, at least in some circles, about three basic frameworks, which are called “new military models,” the first being what I mentioned, the cosmopolitan military model, and its ethical background. It draws in all the literature on R2P and human security. They focus at the state level. At the regional level, at a broader context but maybe still linked to the state, is Mary Kaldor’s “Human Security Response Force,” which was articulated and supported by the EU, and financed by the EU, and she actually [briefed] the concept and it was supposed to be part of a Euro Rapid Reaction Force. It hasn’t moved forward; I can’t find any indication of where that is right now. The other one, the one that seems to be moving the furthest and the fastest, is this United Nations Emergency Peace Service; Peter Langille in Canada big mover and shaker in dealing with that. That’s at the global UN army aspect. It really depends on how you put that together. I personally have a hard time seeing how an independent UN force can actually do this, just because of the ethics and the values, and—let’s just be frank about it—the cost. Peter has put all the costs together, the economic angle on this, and this is tremendous. I can’t see right now, in the immediate future—I’m talking about the next twenty years—that actually happening. I don’t discount that it can at some point, but just based on the ethics and the morality that you need, I think the option will come better through somebody like the European Union, or the independent states, on a redrafting of our commitment to the UN. Of course, those fingers reach deep, because your going into reforming the Security Council, and how that all plays out. So my pick is that it’s going to come through a state sort of mechanism, and not an independent military one. Of course, you know you have military companies who are engaging in peacekeeping. So that would be my point.

**Nalbandov:** I in a sense share Michael’s pessimism about this particular aspect, but a little bit from a different angle. I have in a sense a neo-institutionalist approach to this question. To me, the efficiency of a hypothetical UN force is connected to two things: a) the norm diffusion through the R2P; that the responsibility to protect eventually shall become the norm, which is diffused far deeper than the national level, and far deeper than citizenship. The second part, linked with that diffusion of norm, is the notion of global citizenship. So, as Michael said, it still comes down to the state as main actors. As long as the norm is diffused, as long as the global citizenship is created, I’d still be hesitant to talk about the efficiency of the UN punitive force.

**Peter Dale Scott:** This is a question for both of you. We’ve been talking about these interventions of the nineties, about Somalia, and Bosnia, and Kosova, and East Timor. The one real success was East Timor, and I think the reason there was that people really wanted peace in East Timor. There was a change of government in Indonesia, and there were still people trying to promote violence, but they were now a well-defined minority; and so it succeeded. No one has mentioned that in the other cases, all three of them—Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo—there were players who did not want peace at all. What we roughly call al Qaeda, but is in fact a very complex phenomenon, are people who regard peacekeeping as disruption of the status quo. Don’t misunderstand me: I want peace; I want human security; I want everything that this conference is for. But we have to see it

from the point of view that there are significant players who see this in the context of preserving the status quo that they want to overthrow. I'm surprised that there hasn't been more said about that, because it's so relevant to what's happening in Afghanistan now, where there are people—it's not so much they want to *win*, they want to preserve a state of chaos which they think will ultimately destroy the credibility of Western countries in that part of the world, and lead to a new kind of balance of power. Could you address this problem of dealing with situations where there are players who don't want peace at all, and who are significant players, not just marginal players?

**Rostek:** As I mentioned before, in response to Jamie's question, this is not a short-term solution. The military traditionally like to go after these short-term solutions, but my sense is that the military has a role to play there, in trying to create that secure environment, but this is a longer-term situation through development and human rights. That's the way I would look at that. I'll echo the comments of Lieutenant [Holefu], who was questioned about this whole mess in Afghanistan, and he was asked, "How do you define success in Afghanistan?" He said, "I don't define success in Afghanistan—the Afghans will define success. I'm only here assistance to move toward that goal." I don't think there are any short-term solutions here. You may recall General Hillier, who said, "We're going to be in Afghanistan for at *least* ten years." That created quite an uproar in government in Canada at that time, because nobody could see us being there that long. I think the answers come not necessarily through a military solution, but through the development of a human rights solution, all the civil society taking action, and the Afghans taking responsibility for their own state.

**Nalbandov:** Thank you very much for your question. I'm perhaps the most junior diplomat out of all of you gathered here. I worked for four years in the Georgian foreign ministry, and I can say that what I view as the art of diplomacy is to avoid conflict by any means possible, with the best outcome for yourself. If this is not possible, then the best way out is victory, is success in war. What you mentioned there—indeed, there are different pro-pax and pro-bellum "communities" I would say—I wouldn't extend it to the societies; but at the end of the day we're still talking about a significant amount of leaders who have to be replaced in communities, who are belligerent, who get more economic benefits from waging war, not peace. I think the ultimate task of the international community would be to punish them, to defeat them, to replace the belligerent leaders, and to strengthen what Michael says, the ground-based approach to society-building and to develop this civil polity. After the belligerent leadership is replaced, we can talk about community development.

*Following Session II, Canadian Consul General Stewart Beck presented Canadian Studies Co-Chairs Thomas Barnes and Nelson Graburn with a check representing a grant to the Canadian Studies Program at UC Berkeley, thanking them for having organized the conference, praising the quality of the presentations and conversation, and declaring it "money very well spent."*

### **Session III**

**Chair Harry Kreisler** welcomed participants to the afternoon session, and explained that, the first speaker being unable to attend the conference, his presentation would be given via podcast. He then introduced **Neil MacFarlane** and started the video.

*Canada and Human Security from Chrétien to Harper*  
**Neil MacFarlane**

Dr. MacFarlane began with an anecdote derived from his experience in 1996 doing interviews in post-Soviet Georgia, in the security zone between government-controlled territory and Abkhazia. The zone was policed by a Russian peacekeeping force, which was observed by a small UN contingent (UNOMIG). Horrendous violence had been rained down upon Georgian returnees by Abkhaz forces, and when an officer with the UN contingent was asked what the UNOMIG view on this situation was, he fulminated against civilians' requests for assistance, saying that if he and his colleagues were to protect civilians, they would have no time to observe Russian peacekeepers.

The period since 1996 has seen dramatic change in Canadian security policy: defence is back; hard power is back; general-purpose operations are back; NATO is back. Global interventionary capability is "in." Among the things which may have fallen away in this policy shift is human security, previously a virtual mantra in Ottawa. Despite prolific debate, the core definition of "human security" can be agreed upon to reside in the primacy accorded the security of individual human beings, as opposed to that of the state, the ethnic group, the region, or the international system. Further, the Canadian approach to human security focused on securing freedom from organized violence, rather than from material privation. Such concepts were at the core of the Chrétien government, particularly during Lloyd Axworthy's tenure as foreign minister. Now, however, based on its near-total absence from the Department of Foreign Affairs website (among other indicators), human security would seem to be far from prioritized.

One obvious reason for this lies in the mid-decade change to a less liberal, more "hard-power" government; another involves the altered international context in which Canada resides following 9/11, and the concomitant revival of a more traditional approach to security. A renewed sense of vulnerability to threat will likely be sustained by the ongoing increase of access to the Arctic, whatever the outcome of the situation in Afghanistan. In sum, if the 1990s left space for innovative thinking about foreign policy, the current context has narrowed that space.

Citing Martha Finnemore's work on norm cycles, Dr. MacFarlane deemed the 1990s a period of norm entrepreneurship and innovation, during the course of which widespread promotion of, and acceptance of, concepts and mechanisms surrounding human security and R2P took place. These are now much embedded in institutional discourse and policy, and reflected practically in such instruments as UN peacekeeping mandates. On the state level, issues of human security and protection have new prominence in national military doctrine, such as that of the UK. Conceivably, these advances may owe more to the success of recent missions than to moral principle. For whatever reason, however, the logic of human security has successfully migrated from the realm of discourse to that of policy, such that regardless of apathy on the part of present leadership, it remains alive and well.

Dr. MacFarlane concluded with an anecdote contrasting with the opening one: in a recent conversation with a British colonel, the latter asserted that the protection of civilians and their human security was an essential part of any mission he had recently been involved in or was likely to be involved in in the future.

**Harry Kreisler** regretted that they'd been unable to summon a hologram of Dr. MacFarlane, as had been done for Princess Leia in Star Wars, opined that budgetary woes could well result in the increased immobility of professors as their podcasts replaced them in scholarly meetings around the world, and proceeded to introduce **Jeremy Kinsman**.

*Stemming the Depletion of Canada's Political Capital: The Need to Return to Multilateralism*  
**Jeremy Kinsman**

Canadian foreign policy, suggested Kinsman, ought to be pretty much what it was—*not* what it is today. A CBC poll found Canadians still to be liberal internationalists; why then is there no discussion of foreign policy? The possibilities could include that everybody agrees about it, and that nobody cares about it. But Canadians *do* still care: they just care in different ways than citizens of the U.S. do—less about terrorism, and more about climate change, for instance. Multilateralism and a penchant for “soft power” have been Canada’s traditional specialties, peacekeeping a natural tendency. As the more than a million Canadian participants in wars in Europe reveal, Canada is not unacquainted with hard power. Thousands of Canadians are presently in Afghanistan, some on fourth or fifth tours, leaving scant manpower at home to attend to domestic crises, and without visible UN replacements on the horizon. NATO’s Article 5 is capable of an all-for-one-one-for-all interpretation, but it is also extremely permissive of nonparticipation: it demands a discretionary ruling, and for various reasons discretion has ruled against involvement for most NATO countries.

When Canada leaves Afghanistan in 2011, however, as it has been resolved that it shall do, what will the newly combat-oriented army undertake next? How can the thousands of civilians trained by Provincial Reconstruction Teams in the three D’s (Democracy, Development, and Defense) be profitably employed? Wars will continue; al Qaeda’s not going away. Various forms of intervention will still be necessary, in all likelihood owing more to UN’s Chapter 6—the use of force—than to Chapter 5, keeping the peace.

To contribute to the discussion of R2P’s origins, it remains to be emphasized that getting the Security Council to authorize intervention was a Herculean struggle, because of the nightmarish experiences of intervention previously undergone by such accredited democracies as India and Mexico, while nations like China and Cuba suffered things “no American has ever heard of.” There is surely a need to reconcile the defense of humanity with the defense of sovereignty—which is what emerged from the Millennium Plus Five document. In the context it was found advisable, rather than trying to sell R2P as a doctrine, to present it on a case-by-case basis, in order to win UN support.

A country’s political capital, based upon its deeds, will dissipate over time; rebuilding it requires the performance of actions for which the nation possesses an authentic affinity. Among the conditions impacting upon such a rebuilding are: 1) the absence today of a strategic rivalry among great powers; 2) the major adjustments of relative strength among powers that have occurred in recent decades; 3) the current American regime’s tilt toward multilateralism, including strategic

relations with China and Russia; and 4) the persuasive truth that things can be accomplished through the UN that cannot be accomplished with U.S. power. There are two beliefs prevalent in Canada today which stand in opposition to the restoration of political capital: 1) that all concerns are secondary to that of nourishing the relationship with the U.S., and 2) that burgeoning development worldwide—G8 becoming G20—mandates Canada’s marginalization and her withdrawal to her “neighborhood,” implicitly reinforcing her dependency on the U.S. Both beliefs are wrong.

In terms of gaining political capital, R2P provides a quintessential example of an undertaking to which Canada is authentically suited. (The U.S., by contrast, would have been decidedly unable to lead an R2P initiative—particularly after the invasion of Iraq.) Ready to hand are the refurbished army, kitted out for “robust peacekeeping,” the forces of DDD-skilled civilians, and the intangible yet undeniable Canadian propensity for connection and cooperation. In support of such multilateralist peacemaking efforts as R2P there have to be mandates appropriate to the missions—a UN rapid deployment force, for instance. There should also be a reconceived, solidified NATO, one that is global, collective, and diplomatically acceptable on a large scale (e.g., in the Middle East). Mediation among conflicting political entities, including terrorist groups, would be another suitable use of Canada’s strengths, as would the pursuit and enforcement of weapons nonproliferation. Negotiation on the climate change front—without which there will be no meaningful accord—requires the kind of leadership of which Canada is capable and to which it is manifestly suited. Finally, the cultivation of international relations—particularly south of the U.S., with Cuba and Mexico for example—will prove invaluable in Canada’s redefining her place in the international arena.

### Q&A

**Q:** A question for Jeremy: you didn’t talk about Canada’s influence in the world, multilaterally; what about the Americas? I know that for foreign affairs now there is a bit of an emphasis on that. Do you think that it’s possible for Canada to play a role, and does that depend on our relationship with Mexico, and the Americas more broadly?

**Kinsman:** I love the idea; I don’t see the reality. I hate to be mean, but we have a prime minister who referred to our “enemies and adversaries” in Latin America. I don’t know who they are. I think that the connection is to the government of Colombia. There are attempts to have other connections, but we’ve been fighting with the Brazilians now for twenty years over trade subsidies or a variety of things. There’s no meat on the bones yet, except, I would say in the commonwealth Caribbean. There’s the tragic case of Haiti, where actually we are working with the Brazilians. Then there’s Mexico. I think it’s a great idea.

You know, I don’t like the idea of a hemisphere being just north-south; Montréal’s one hell of a lot closer to Berlin or Paris than it is to Buenos Aires or São Paulo. I don’t think there’s anything intrinsically *natural* about it, but it’s great to do, if you can do it. In life you can’t do everything, but Trudeau used to say (I know he used to say this because I wrote it for him), that Canada’s a global power because we have important relationships in every part of the world. And that’s true, and so we do in South America, and I think that’s important. But again, this is a question of credibility: you’ve got to get something into it. We have a very good relationship with Chile, I

must say. But it's not there yet. I'm sorry, Stewart—is Stewart still here?—because I don't want to . . . well, never mind.

**Harry Kreisler:** I heard you emphasize two elements: one was capability—that is, even in this dark period of Canadian foreign policy capabilities were developed which Canada be redeployed. The problem becomes a government that has a very narrow view of role, so it's the interface of these two things. So the future lies in new leadership. I'm just wondering if you would compare Canada and the U.S., in what you see as what is embedded in the society that would obstruct the positive elements you see. One an really see in the United States that, even if we have Obama, the move to multilateralism might provoke people who just don't want anything to do with the UN, and they might be influential in congressional elections, midterm elections, and in the next presidential election. Is anything like that true in Canada? That is, that there are either institutions or public opinion that would oppose the potential that you see happening with the new government?

**Kinsman:** My belief is that Canadians remain liberal humanistic internationalists. Canadians, for better or for worse, are somewhat allergic to the use of force, and that is nowhere more true than in Québec, which I would say verges on mass pacifism. The support for our remaining in Afghanistan in combat mode after 2011 in Canada is I think in single digits now. You couldn't do *that*. But Canadians would be very supportive I think of anything that was being done internationally that corresponded to their notions of Canada. Lloyd can speak to this; but the parties do break down in terms of having different clienteles. The Liberal Party is strongest in the biggest cities, and the biggest cities tend to be more cosmopolitan, and tend to be more internationalist—though not always in Canada, because in the prairies there is a strong tradition of grain-based internationalism. Alberta, in its way (it may be the only place George Bush can give a speech and get any bucks—southern Alberta), I mean when I was in Russia, Albertans were all over the place because of the oil and gas stuff, and there's a lot of internationalism. So I think Canada's internationalist.

As to the United States, as I said I think here the other day, my biggest fear is not that Americans are going to turn against Obama and try to something in the UN; it's that Americans are just going to get tired of the world—that it's a mean, cruel world; it's mean and cruel to Americans, or it seems to be—and a new form of isolation is going to emerge, particularly as the problems of infrastructure and deficit, the debates that are internal to America, cascade—I think that that's a risk. I don't think that would happen in Canada, Harry, but if it happens in the United States, it's going to be a real tragedy, and one of the principal vocations of any thoughtful Canadian is to have to try to help that not happen in the United States. That's another reason to support the United States. I was talking about credibility, and your reputation as an asset: there are some countries, any American diplomats will tell you this, where if you can get Canada to go along with an initiative, you're kind of getting somebody parental—somebody who has judgment and who isn't just doing it to show off; that it means something, that it's a multiplier. I think that that's we have to use to benefit the internationalists everywhere.

**Kreisler:** You're implicitly saying that a superpower can be adolescent.

**Peter Dale Scott:** I wanted to ask this question; I wasn't sure if it was really on agenda, but it does grow out of what you just said. While we're talking here, Obama is in Washington, weighing an enormously important decision on Afghanistan that will affect not just America, but the entire

world. Some of us have been drawing Vietnam analogies, but this goes way beyond Vietnam. If forty more thousand troops go to that area, it will cast a shadow over the world that Vietnam War never did, I believe. My question to you is, does it appear to you that it is appropriate for America to be weighing these decisions as unilaterally as they are? We have the governments of Britain, France, and Canada, for various reasons, who as I understand it are staying pretty well out of this debate. If you were the foreign minister of Canada, would you feel at this point that was appropriate? Two parts of the question: a) should Canada be involved in this decision, what to do in Afghanistan, and second, what would you—I guess I'm addressing it more to you, Jeremy Kinsman, than you, the mythical foreign minister—what would recommend in that part of the world?

**Kinsman:** Well, those are pretty lofty costumes to put on, Peter, but I will say this: Stanley McChrystal's report, which, to me bizarrely, was leaked to Bob Woodward before it got to the president, was I thought even more strangely endorsed by NATO ministers, even though three quarters of the people in the room weren't themselves going to provide any soldiers. It was simply, "Yeah, the United States should put up the forty thousand," or the thirty-two; I don't know what option he's going to choose. As for Canada, as we're getting out, I think it would be unconvincing for a Canadian foreign minister or any minister or any Canadian to go and tell the Americans what they should do—because we're leaving, you know? And I think it's actually been rather thoughtful of Obama not to berate us over that; because he knows the price we've paid has been disproportionate, and that the traffic just won't bear any more, and he knows that. He, himself, has a dreadful problem to bear, and the dreadful problem is called Lyndon Baines Johnson: fighting an unpopular war at the time you're trying to do socially, dramatically revolutionary legislation at home. He's obsessed by it, everybody tells me; not *obsessed* by it, but it's his biggest problem. No one quite knows the right outcome is in Afghanistan. I believe that what is happening is that he is buying time to see if some kind of alternative method of dealing with the central problem (the central problem being, I think, the nuclear weapons in Pakistan), dealing with that in a way that makes it more predictable and sure. Sy Hersh has an article in the *New Yorker* this week—I thought, you know, sometimes freedom of the press can go too far—detailing the plans that the United States military has to seize those weapons in the event of a change of government that is negative in Pakistan—by negative I mean if the Taliban actually went on to win. I don't really have an answer beyond that. I think Obama has a dreadful problem; he didn't create it; he got it. Is it Taliban? I don't know. People can debate that into the night. It was al Qaeda; is it still al Qaeda? It sure is the possibility of a Taliban government in Pakistan, and having those nuclear weapons. That's the problem. I think putting forty thousand people in there to get time, to get some kind of a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan, if that's possible. . . . I mean Mullah Omar three days ago said that al Qaeda's not him anymore—that's not him; he's done that, and he won't be that in the future. Is that just sweet talking? I don't know. It's very complex; it's a deeply complex problem. Obama wanted to be president; now he is. Now he has to go to all of these funerals. It's no fun; I don't envy the guy. I don't think he's made a bad decision on this yet; he hasn't really made any decision. I think the decision he's going to make is one that's going to postpone the bigger decision until later on.

**Kreisler:** Picking up on what Peter said about what role should other actors play—when you look at this problem, it's as if when we focus on it unilaterally, we just focus on a very narrow aspect. Because in the end, you can't resolve this without all the regional actors. And you immediately

think about Pakistan and its fear of India and so on. What does that tell us about the world we *could* build, versus the one that comes into being, in the sense that we're not putting all the regional issues on the table. Because you're not going to do anything about Pakistan until its military stops focusing on the threat from India; so India has to be at the table. And obviously, when we're talking about Pakistan, Iran has to be at the table, because they have a border. I think this was implicit in what Peter was suggesting—so play with that a little. As we focus on this new agenda, we seem to be forgetting the old agenda.

**Kinsman:** Well, you know, Americans were puzzled, and a lot of stuff was said on Fox News, the cables, and the radio shows about Obama's Nobel Prize; and of course he didn't ask for it, and he was embarrassed by it. But the reason he got it was the single word, "engagement." Because he understands exactly what you have just said. Do you know that Iran lost more people to the Taliban, before 9/11, than anybody else? They lost upwards of 7,000 border guards, because they were trying to keep the heroin from going across Iran. Iran is no friend to the Taliban. Iran offered enormous asserts to the United States after 9/11, with respect to spotting, with respect to intelligence, which the United States turned down. That was then. I think, having been close, because of my democracy work, to what went on in Tehran this summer, and to the people there, I think he is absolutely right to engage Iran now on the regional issues. I think that's what Iran wants. Who would have believed that it would be Ahmadinejad who was pushing for getting rid of the fissile material to Russia, to get it enriched there, and being opposed by both the right and the left? I think it does work. The wild card remains, Harry, and I have to go back to it, and I think it's the scariest country in the world, is Pakistan. Because Pakistan is not responding. Pakistan is in a turmoil. There is a huge identity issue, there's an obsession with India, there's an obsession with Kashmir, there is the cast of the army, there's fervent, basic, enduring anti-Americanism that is almost unique in the world. I was listening on a podcast to a Pakistani lawyer, who was obviously a fellow in jurisprudence at St. Anthony's College or something, telling the interviewer from National Public Radio that given a choice between Taliban-run and American-run Pakistan they'll take Taliban-run Pakistan any day, because they're from there. False reasoning, dangerous—but really worrisome. Yes, you do have to have regional approaches. That's why Holbrook's appointment was what it was—his appointment was not just for Afghanistan; it was for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.

**Kreisler:** Which they had to take off the title.

**Kinsman:** They did, because of the neuroses about that; but my point is that the regional approach was fundamental, and the solutions are going to have to be regional, and the guarantees are going to have to be regional. But it ain't easy, that's for sure.

**Q:** Greg Cross, Civil Engineering. I want to bring up a comment that Tom Barnes made this morning; I don't remember if it was on his own behalf or not. He mentioned that Hugo Chávez from Venezuela was one of the first opponents to this Responsibility To Protect, and basically saw it as License To Invade. I wanted to ask you to address that; not just what you think of it, but why an elected leader in a country that actually has some of the world's better race relations—well, they have a lot of other problems—would even fear such a thing? Is this really a danger, that this could come into a way that essentially the Security Council Club could use this to step on whomever they really don't like at the time?

**Kinsman:** There are a bunch of countries, Greg, that we in the democracy business refer to as the “Authoritarian *Internationale*.” You can see them, you know who they are—it’s going to Algeria, Cuba, Venezuela, Libya, Sudan—and they’re tacitly, and sometimes overtly (less overtly now), supported by China—and of course Myanmar and Zimbabwe.

**Q [Cross?]:** Would you include Iran, or not?

**Kinsman:** Yes and no; it depends what the issue is. And the reason, for some of them, is rather sincere. If you’re an Algerian, you have pretty strong feelings about foreign intervention. But they also fear for an intervention being used against them. The biggest rock thrown at the head of R2P was thrown by the invasion of Iraq—because the WMD case (when there wasn’t one), when there was no tie between Saddam and al Qaeda, and I can’t remember what other things were cooking, and there was nothing left except to say, “Well, we did it to bring democracy to Iraq”—it just made Chávez’s day. But at the end of the day, Hugo Chávez is all about populism, he’s all about visceral Latin American anti-Americanism . . . some of it goes back to Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, if you want, but it’s mostly about that kind of excitable, predictable dislike of anything that emanates from Washington. That’s what he gets off on, and it keeps him going, and Venezuelans, at least the ones who actually do vote for him—poor ones—it keeps them going, too. But we shall overcome, that’s my feeling—or we shall endure. You endured this, and I thank you for that.

#### *Session IV*

**Chair Camille Crittenden** noted that the UC Berkeley Human Rights Center (co-sponsors of this conference) hosted a conference themselves on R2P a couple of years ago featuring Canadian General Romeo Dallaire as keynote speaker; that conference produced a report, “The Responsibility to Protect: Moving the Campaign Forward,” which is available at the Human Rights Center website, [hrc.berkeley.edu](http://hrc.berkeley.edu).

*Doing Good and Doing Well: Canada and the Responsibility to Protect—A Civil Society Perspective*

**Fergus Watt**

R2P is a collective undertaking, and as such has critical need of the UN’s machinery for consensus formation. Canada’s involvement with R2P is informed by the two dominant influences on her foreign policy—cultivation of the Canada–U.S. relationship, and strengthening multilateralism. These interests are frequently in conflict. The latter is more clearly aligned with Canada’s enduring support of R2P; the former—so far at least—has been unaffected by it.

The 2001 report of the ICISS played a catalytic role in the development of normative and operational consensus in R2P, and in defining “the role of the state in an interdependent world.” That the report weathered the troubled and doubt-filled period following 9/11 is a testament to its conceptual strength, and to the persistence of its commissioners, co-chairmen, and drafters. Canada was heavily involved in the series of small meetings and general consensus-building leading up to

the 2005 UN Reform World Summit, and in the tumultuous negotiations leading to the Summit's Outcome Document.

Under the Conservative government of Stephen Harper, however, R2P has been a lesser priority, and a political culture less multilateralist than self-protective has evolved. To the extent that this involves adhering to U.S. policy, it is ironic that the current U.S. administration is in the process of drawing Canada back into a multilateralist stance; and continued involvement on the part of government officials in R2P is shielded by the United States' active interest in the initiative.

Meanwhile, the UN has energetically advanced the R2P norm. Ed Luck, the Secretary-General's Special Advisor on R2P, spoke of the moral responsibility not to "wait for the bodies to pile up"; and Ban Ki-Moon's report on "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect" refined and rearticulated the operative concepts of R2P, whose threefold goal is to prevent, or stop, genocide, crimes against humanity, and "ethnic cleansing." Related activities on the part of civil societies might include promulgating further discussion of R2P in the UN; advocacy of regional consensus; encouraging "R2P-specific" governmental activity; and the establishment of supranational (north-south) bases of support.

In a final round-up of ideas, Dr. Watt noted that there is great need of a small, rapidly deployable UN Emergency Peace Service; Security Council reform may surprise everyone by actually taking place; the current volume both of peace operations and of sanctions applied to regimes outstrips the ability of the UN Council to supervise them; and the advent of G20 this summer, at a summit hosted by Canada, will generate additional pressures for Security Council reform.

*The Failure to Protect: Fear and Exposure to Violence in Eastern Congo and Northern Uganda*  
**Phuong Pham**

Working out of the Human Rights Center at UC Berkeley, Dr. Pham and her associates employ empirical research and new technologies to assess the impact of conflicts on populations, and to assess these populations' opinions about and desire for justice and peace; these data are provided to key stakeholders in the countries they work with. An epidemiologist by training, Pham inspects data recording the events that occur when people are not protected from genocide or human rights violations. She looks for patterns and early warning signs, seeking possible means of prevention. A situation in which R2P would have been welcome occurred in Myanmar in 2008, amid the widespread destruction wrought by Cyclone Nargis. Pham's team was prevented by the government from gaining access to the region affected; formally legislated right of access for humanitarian intervention within the critical first forty-eight hours following the disaster would have made an enormous difference.

Pham presented data from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), during the escalation of conflict in 2007, and northern Uganda, during the (ultimately fruitless) 2007 peace negotiations. In both regions, open-ended questionnaires and local interviewers were used to obtain sociological data; the survey team did their best to overcome the difficulty, due to the many uncertainties involved, of providing ethnic and linguistic matches for the target groups. Access to regions, as recently in a Central African Republic area isolated by flooding, can be difficult as well, but usually not *impossible*—a word the team strenuously avoids.

The three main outcomes of conflict in northern Uganda were destruction of property, often resulting in massive displacement of population; death; and abduction—the latter surprisingly far more common than sexual violence. Sexual violence was however reported by 16 percent of the subjects, both male and female. Many subjects were forced to commit violence, and numerous abducted children were forced to become combatants, at times being made to kill their own families, thereby removing the possibility of their returning to their native village and ensuring their continued participation in the abducting force. (Data involving the forced commission of violence and consequent enrollment in rebel forces are higher in Uganda, where there was initially little support for the rebels, and thus an incentive to resort to such practices, than in Congo, where a village typically housed a number of supporters. There is no way of quantifying the degree of volition involved in the widespread juvenile enlistment in rebel groups.) One unfortunately retrospective outcome of analysis of the data sets is that the survey team now knows, fifteen years too late, the roads along which the bulk of the abductions took place.

In another disturbing finding, many of the 90+ percent of the population living in IDP (refugee) camps in northern Uganda were the victims of violence, property destruction, verbal abuse, or harassment on the part of the Uganda People's Defense Force, who were entrusted with their protection. Among data presented regarding the populations' sense of safety, northern Ugandans in 2007 felt safer than Congolese. In answer to the question "Who protects you?", a majority named a deity, forty percent said the military, and few expressed confidence in the United Nations mission (MONUC), against whom there were demonstrations protesting the perceived lack of protection provided. Data on post-traumatic stress disorder indicate that damage wrought by violence is not just immediate but continues on into the future, resulting in a diminished sense of security which impedes recovery from the ordeal.

The porosity of borders and problems of access render timely and well-placed protection difficult, but with on-time, accurate data, it is doable. Pham gets daily data sets from Central Africa, gathered by trained local users of phones equipped with GPS coordinates and solar charges. If the political will is there, it is possible to empower the population. These populations are not helpless—they can protect themselves, if provided with the mechanisms and resources to do so.

## Q&A

**Robert Nalbandov:** A question for Fergus: from the point of view of international communities' reactions in interventions, I think that when we're talking, from a linguistic perspective, about "something that happens after something"—the word "re-action," the response to something that has happened . . . humanitarian intervention usually happens *after* humanitarian disaster. Taking into account all the human factor limitations and economic limitations, and you talked about UN force: how viable in your opinion might be the change, or the shift, from "responsibility to protect" to "responsibility to prevent"?—meaning action *before* something has really happened. Because the genocides do not happen overnight. Had the Rwandan developments been prevented since 1959, the cultural revolution and the move to power, had that been timely prevented with international sanctions, I would really doubt that whatever happened would have happened.

**Watt:** I agree, and I think that's where the emphasis is going, is on prevention, on empowering communities, whether it's capacity-building of the state, or a range of options that are not just about R2P but include the R2P rubric. If it's about reaction, after the fact, and often in the case of the UN you know, two, three, six months after the fact, it's too late and it's often expensive, so this is where the emphasis can go. The framework now that was agreed on this summer in the General Assembly includes a broad continuum from prevention to post-conflict. Conflict prevention is something that governments have never done well, and practitioners and academics say, "Yeah, right—we'll never get *that* done." As we move forward on R2P there's a lot of low-hanging fruit, practical things that governments can do just to empower themselves, to stop these kinds of things.

**Thomas Barnes:** A quick question for Phuong: does anybody receive your data, that can then be used to early warning in a situation? In other words, can you give it to the UN, can you give it to the Canadian Foreign Service, or even the American State Department? Is there any way that you can get that data to the government in a timely way?

**Phuong Pham:** I think that would be our goal for the future, and that's the reason we're developing this technology we're using in Central Africa: we want to be able to take early warning data. We're going to start that process in Liberia; we're going to join one other group to try to be able to start that mechanism, because that's what we really need. But because our data is only as good as it's useful somebody, so we do need that mechanism, that ability—that's what we would love to do.

**Barnes:** Have any organizations shown an interest in using it? I mean, has anybody come to you and said, "Hey, this is great: can you do this for us? Can we use that data?"

**Pham:** I think it's only for evidence now in criminal prosecution, unfortunately, not for early warning. I think UNICEF has used our abduction data to formulate their protection programs in northern Uganda, and that's why we did that exercise, looking retrospectively at that data set, was trying to figure out ways to help them develop their protection program.

**Peter Dale Scott:** You made a very interesting point about the "black map [which indicated key abduction routes]," showing all the roads; it obviously suggests that with hindsight one could have done something. Has that gone to any group to be converted to an action program?

**Pham:** As I mentioned, that is what we're trying to do next. There is one concrete thing we are doing specifically: there is an Office of Transition Initiatives that is being run by USAID, and they've asked us to do the third survey, and that's part of the process we're going to use, to gather data for their projects and also for their programs. We're slowly working there, but nothing systematic, nothing at the policy level yet, I would say—not to the extent that we'd like.

**Q:** This is an additional observation on the last two questions: the role of citizens in collecting information, providing it to authorities, particularly in terms of assistance to the International Criminal Court, is another important development. It's something that when we think of the "responsibility to protect," it's *everybody's* responsibility; it's not just some leading major powers'. In terms of the International Criminal Court, the prosecutor relies on the work of NGO's—there's

an ongoing partnership, with information being provided, and so on. Groups like this have an important role to play in terms of creating accountability for these crimes.

### *Session V*

*Chair Nelson Graburn* recognized Chancellor **Robert Birgeneau**—an extremely good friend of Canadian Studies—and thanked him for taking the time to come to the conference. He then introduced **The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy**, Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1996 to 2000, and a nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize for his work on land mines.

Keynote Address

*R2P—An Idea Whose Time Has Come*

**The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy**

As a foreign minister, Dr. Axworthy found himself essentially to be a plumber, fixing leaks here and there. His initial mandate from Prime Minister McCutcheon in January 1996 began, “You have a responsibility for the safety and protection of Canadian citizens”—which seemed a weighty burden indeed, particularly given the peripatetic habits of Canadians and the changing nature of the world: the Berlin Wall was coming down; terrorism was on its way up. There were now (in Kofi Annan’s words) “problems without passports,” and a government’s traditional reaction time and method no longer worked: it was a “new playbook.” A fresh surveying of Canada’s place “on the North American rock” was required.

Early work undertaken in this new world involved the treaty on banning land mines, a non-governmentally-based initiative which began among Vietnam War veterans in the U.S.; President Clinton was the first to bring it to the attention of the United Nations. The Ottawa Treaty was the product of the collaboration of thousands of victims’ rights organizations worldwide, and a strong indication of the multilateral, international nature of policymaking in the future, and of its reliance on the efforts of minor powers. A revision of the previous, “academic” definition of human security took place, expanding its parameters to include protection from famine, disease, poverty, and war (not just the latter); recognition of the new, sub- or extra-national (rather than cross-border) nature of conflict; and the necessity for partnership and networks. This new “security politics of the 1990s” had as its central tenet the protection of those anywhere who were vulnerable to threat and could not protect themselves.

Subsequent deployment of this new, coalition-based technique for promoting security targeted garnering support for the International Criminal Court, and proved successful as well (in part, Dr. Axworthy feels, because the major powers hadn’t yet caught on to shifting international realities, or to the new political tactics they necessitated). The ICC has now become one of the most important and active institutions in the R2P movement.

The conflict in Kosovo was a turning point in, not the genesis of, R2P; along with a host of complementary events, it ratified R2P’s increasingly prominent role on the international agenda. Canada’s primary impetus for desiring, and obtaining, a seat on the Security Council was its desire never again to “stand by and watch 10,000 people get murdered,” as had happened in Srebrenica

due to disorganized international response. But Kosovo was the turning point—or, as David Trim had it, “the moment when the rubber hits the road”—when the realization sunk in that diplomatic effort and soft power were doomed to be inadequate to the task, and force would have to be used: “protection sometimes takes the sharp end of the stick.” Out of the ad hoc, under-organized action in Kosovo was born the recognition of the need for a rule of law, and an institutional format, to regulate such undertakings. Secretary-General Annan was approached regarding the formulation of a commission, and he responded that he could not take it before the UN, but the Canadians could and should: “You produce the report,” he said, “and I will officially accept it.” (Dr. Axworthy parenthetically disclosed that it was Francis Deng, UN Special Envoy for Internally Displaced Persons, who coined the term “responsibility to protect,” having declared to Dr. Axworthy at one point in 1997 that there were twenty or thirty million internally displaced persons worldwide, and nobody took the responsibility to protect them.)

R2P slowly progressed, through various commissions and groups, into the 2005 Summit, where it garnered a wholly unanticipated eighty-five percent vote of support. It was first used in the 2007 Security Council Resolution on Darfur. The African Union, at a November 2009 meeting in Uganda, has established a historic convention for using R2P. It has outstripped any suspicion that it was somehow an insidious plot on the part of the old colonial powers. How is it to be utilized now, though? Dr. Axworthy made three suggestions on that score. First, it has to be brought up to date, principally through the incorporation of gender into the realms of prevention, rebuilding, and intervention. A lesson learned from development work is that women’s involvement in the tasks of rebuilding and reconciliation is crucial. There is further the unfortunate truth that rape has become a dominant tool in the arsenal of modern conflicts, making gender a mandatory aspect of any discussion of R2P.

Second, whatever the nature of the forces R2P ultimately deploys, their success depends on their having a quick reaction time; in this capacity, strong coalition and the development of broad-based networks are indispensable. Finally there is the issue of Afghanistan: is it an R2P situation or not? In the classic tradition of Canadians “who come to the U.S. and tell you how to do your business,” Dr. Axworthy opined that President Obama’s agonizing over Afghanistan would be clarified by adopting an R2P standpoint, and focusing on human security. He feels that the military operation is increasingly making that adjustment, but a viable diplomatic approach, and the means of dealing with corruption among Afghani leadership, have yet to materialize. Application of the R2P principle can be effective in stabilizing a country, but you can’t stabilize a country under the sway of a leadership based on drugs and warlords.

Dr. Axworthy deemed his final point “heretical”—that the time has come for the application of R2P beyond the protection of civilians from violence, to combating other sources of prominent danger to the global population, most notably climate change. Abundant and diverse expertise has long since confirmed that, barring major intercession, anthropogenic alteration of the climate will result in endemic famine, lack of water, and conflict over resources; it currently constitutes the single greatest risk to humanity. Can this be regarded not just as an environmental issue, but a *security* issue? Bernard Kouchner, the founder of Médecins sans Frontières, referred to the Burmese typhoon discussed in Phuong Pham’s presentation as “an R2P issue.” It would not be necessary to act under the aegis of R2P, but merely to adopt its foundational principles, endorsing the capacity of the nation-state, but asserting that if a nation-state fails to protect its civilians from

grievous harm, the international community has a responsibility to intervene. Such intervention—involving widespread sanctions, among other means—would, Dr. Axworthy feels, significantly alter the dialogue surrounding climate issues. Progress in this direction is already being made: in 2008, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference charged the United States of America before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with cultural genocide.

There is not at present any international governance framework for reconciling the right of the state with the requirements of a global crisis. Responsibility to Protect may form the necessary bridge between the two. Dr. Axworthy closed by quoting Sir Martin Gilbert [from the *Global Mail*, 2007]: “Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, non-interference in the internal policies of even the most repressive governments was the golden rule of international diplomacy. The Canadian-sponsored concept of Responsibility to Protect proposed the most significant adjustment to national sovereignty in three hundred sixty years. It declared that for a country’s sovereignty to be respected, it must demonstrate responsibility to its own citizens.” “Amen,” he added.

## Q&A

**Jamie Rowan:** Hi. I’m Jamie Rowan; I asked a question earlier.

**Axworthy:** From the Law School, right?

**Rowan:** Yes. Two questions, one related to the relationship between the International Criminal Court and the Responsibility to Protect. One question that keeps coming up for me is the way that courts now, and quasi-judicial mechanisms like truth commissions, are being given a role, a mandate, that extends far beyond what their basic ideas are, and the dangers of that—the high expectations and long-term disenchantment, which you see clearly in Bosnia and Serbia and Croatia. So I’m wondering if we put too much emphasis on what military intervention can do for people, what the backlash of that long-term is. That’s my first question. My second question is, I’m still struggling to see the difference between “the responsibility to protect” and “human rights.” I see human rights as rooted in states’ sovereignty emerging from 1945, but I’m still trying to understand how the responsibility to protect would avoid some of the pitfalls that the human rights ideas have had in the long term, promoting the vision that you are promoting through responsibility to protect.

**Axworthy:** Gee, I’m glad I’m not teaching in Law School. The first answer: what I have seen emerging is quite a fascinating evolution of an international justice system. It’s quite embryonic, but from the regional tribunals, which are ad hoc, set up by the Security Council, to the International Criminal court, which was based on a global treaty, to now a series of new judicial institutions—there’s a Court on Human [and People’s] Rights coming up in Africa, a commission, something happening in the Americas. . . . We’re beginning to see quite an interesting variety of hybrid courts—as we had in Sierra Leone, as we had in Cambodia; some of them are partly national courts, some of them partly international. But they also have as a basic standard that norm-setting, which I think is really important: that ultimately (and this is where I think the human security idea is), an individual, no matter how powerful they are, whether they be foreign minister, or prime minister, or general, is now directly accountable for their behavior to other individuals;

and if they commit a crime, they will be held accountable. You can no longer say, “The State made me do it.” That is perhaps one of the most important transformations. And it’s now being written into a series of practices, and conventions, and institutions. We’ve got a long way to go; but I say to my students at my own university, who are interested in doing international work, that if I had it to do all over again, I would want to be at the ground floor of this new international justice system. Because there’s really something there. Why is it important now? Because I think it fulfills that commitment that you don’t have to use force, there are alternatives: you can hold people accountable for their crimes. And does that become a [feature?]? I think there are an increasing number of examples of people giving up their position, surrendering—the message is getting out. The Sudanese—Bashir is going absolutely nuts trying to get other countries to abnegate their commitments to the ICC, and the African states won’t do it. They make lots of noise, but they won’t do it—because they realize that that’s their protection, too. I think that it is an increasing part of that international rule of law regime that I think is emerging, and the justice part runs in parallel, or in consonance, with the requirement for diplomatic intervention, economic intervention, military intervention.

The second part of the question: the R2P charter experience for me, being in Mr. Trudeau’s cabinet when it happened, and then having to deal with the decisions all the time: we were told that there are basic women’s rights that we were ignoring, legislation on things like abortion, the whole question of executions—Parliament had to come to the bar and start making decisions on fundamental human rights issues. We couldn’t escape any more: the court was holding us accountable. The human rights movement, you’re right, began really to emerge out of the Second World War, and had great national and international covenants and charters. . . . I think it has grown a lot more, because we’re getting institutions now, and practices, and even more important, young men and women trained in international criminal law—not international justice law, but international criminal law—who are becoming very skilled at knowing how to apply it, and doing the kind of forensic examinations, the pathology, the epistemology, to provide evidence-based judgments against people who commit crimes against other people. That, to me, is an incredibly exciting development. I’d like to check the curriculum at Berkeley, to see if they’ve got a course on the new emerging international justice system. I think it’s exciting. I hope that’s an answer, in part, to your question.

**Sandy Shartzer:** I’m an anti-war activist and a mediator with the Community Mediation Center in Marin County. Just as an extension of what you were just saying, we’re holding people accountable for war crimes and so forth; we’re trying to abolish impunity; we’re getting rid of land mines; we’re making this progress within the International Criminal Court and so forth. Wouldn’t it be a logical if not next step but ultimate step, to totally abolish war of all sorts, and to eventually do away with all use of military force, including under the context of R2P? So that eventually, everything would be resolved through law and non-violence, and ultimately mediation, which I consider to be better than the use of courts, but we need to take things one step at a time.

**Axworthy:** I don’t think there is any one signal, or silver bullet, solution or panacea. It’s like a good orchestra: you need a lot of different instruments to get the right harmony going. At least in the future as I see it, and maybe I don’t have that much longer to see it, but the way we’re going, you’re going to need both the military and constabulary force in order to hold people accountable. I have sat in meetings with Milosevic, Foday Sankoh in Sierra Leone, and I said, “I’m meeting evil

people.” I’m not trying to be religious about this—I’m a kind of mainstream Protestant. But I really thought, “These are people who will kill almost for the joy of doing it; they have no recrimination.” So you have to put restraints and rules in place. Can you use the tools of mediation to do it? Absolutely, and I think it’s an underused technique. Harry mentioned this afternoon about how the Norwegians are really setting a model as a country, as they tried to do in Sri Lanka. There needs to be an awful lot more of that. But ultimately, as I tried to tell you, when I got down to Kosovo I just realized there is no truck or trade with what Milosevic was up to, and we just had to step in. And we did it with reluctance. And to look back on it now, I still believe it was the right decision. So, to go back to the presentation we had this morning: let’s change the military. Let’s get off the man on horseback and the cavalry ride, let’s go down to a much more calibrated, effective use of military power and its influence, primarily as a deterrent, and ultimately as a sanction, so that you can put these people in jail.

**Barry [Gurden?]:** Does the concept of responsibility to protect take into consideration the basic requirements of democracy? For example it’s been talked about extensively in the American media that Canada played a major role in Pakistan’s acquiring the nuclear bomb. If you think that’s correct, was there a type of relativism that did not take into account Pakistan’s non-democratic structure.

**Axworthy:** I think we have some culpability with India; I’m not sure we have any with Pakistan, and not simply because we were selling nuclear reactors. Can I just do a quick historical footnote for you, which I personally think is kind of overlooked but I’m kind of proud of? We were the first nuclear country, which had all the capacity to build weapons—we were part of the Manhattan Project, we had the uranium, and we had the technology (in fact, the head of bomb development in Los Alamos was a Manitoban)—and, for very quirky reasons, we decided not to. We had the airplanes; we had the technology; we had the missile fuel; and we had the know-how. And we just, at some point in 1946, the Canadian cabinet, without a big hullabaloo, just said, “Nope. We’re not going to be a nuclear power, we’re going to devote ourselves to peaceful uses.” Which meant that we built reactors; one of those reactors wound up in India, and the Indians sort of broke the rules and played naughty with it, and we got kind of excited—it’s always been sort of a little bit of a sore point between us and the Indians. But Pakistan we had nothing to do with. What I’m saying is, a country can still be very reasonably happy and prosperous internationally without nuclear weapons: you don’t need them. You talk about President Obama’s early nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize—it wasn’t just for the engagement. I think that he has adopted what has become a very strong movement, in this country and other countries, which is to ultimately get rid of nuclear weapons. I don’t think anything could be more important than that right now.

**Gurden:** You’re denying, then, that Canada did play a major role. . . .

**Axworthy:** Yes. There’s no evidence whatsoever that there was, and I think there’s been enough investigation of that. In fact our relations with Pakistan are pretty prickly along the way, because when we were in the Commonwealth, we were the ones who put the ban on Pakistan, and things of that sort; so they don’t like us very much now. Maybe they like us *now*, because we’re close to being on the same side.

*At this point, Nelson Graburn opened up the floor to discussion among other speakers and the gathering generally.*

**Peter Dale Scott:** I have a degree in political science, but I'm also a poet, and this is a poet's question. The Treaty of Westphalia comes up quite a lot in the last decade, partly because we're seeing an increase in the rule of law, which is in a sense leap-frogging over the notion of state sovereignty as being the basis for it; and also another reason (Woodrow Wilson is partly responsible for this)—that for a century we've been extrapolating the notion of statehood to areas where it's only, I think, marginally applicable. I distinguish, myself, between suzerain states, where people . . . I spent some time in Southeast Asia, where there were kingdoms like that of Nan, a tiny little town in northern Thailand, and for a time the Sipsawngpanna in China paid tribute to the City of Nan. The idea that you have fiefdoms which occasionally will kowtow or pay not so much a tax as a tribute, because it wasn't regularly levied, it was just voluntarily contributed. And you look around all the trouble zones we have now, all of them can be seen either to a greater or a lesser degree as suzerain states. This is certainly true of Afghanistan: it's sort of traditional to call it a "failed state," but it never was a state, like the states we have in the West. It was a collection of tribes, and a succession of people who would be king for a while and then be assassinated and then there would be somebody else. It's a very violent history, and the peaceful periods are when no one tried to exert a central authority; and one of the mistakes I think we're making now—I really think it is a mistake, in both Afghanistan and Pakistan—is to try to exert, for the first time really, a vigorous central authority where there never has been one. This is much more applicable to what I think is the disastrous pressure from America on Zardari in Pakistan to go into South Waziristan, which the British having learned their lesson in—what was it, 1841, or something—they lost an entire army of 18,000 in Afghanistan: they never tried to subdue South Waziristan, and that was wise; and that was, in a sense, a contribution to peace if you want in that area. We are radically dislocating that. This is a question, but I had to set it up. Is it true that R2P is going to mean in the long run, as there is more and more recognition of the rights of individuals and responsibilities in the global community, is going to mean less and less respect for state sovereignty as it was defined . . . I mean, if you look at Max Weber's definition of sovereignty, it is the monopoly of power in an area. I mean, you can't even apply that to the United States, where you have the mafia and all kinds of things; but it's just ridiculous to try to apply it to Afghanistan, or Pakistan. But, increasingly, is it not true that we will just become more and more accustomed to the rights of individuals, and think less and less about the sovereignty of states, and won't that be a good thing?

**Axworthy:** I'll try to answer that. I won't pretend that I have it totally conceived, but here's what I would respond. First, the twentieth century was sort of a killing period over all. The emergence of the state system tended to stabilize, and also has been the vehicle by which we have been able to address rights, some social rights, some economic rights, latterly women's rights, because it did have the capacity to make decisions to draw on. In Afghanistan, what you're faced with is that if you just leave the warlords alone, which is what Karzai basically does—I mean, he's a coalition of warlords—the rights of women would be both ignored and trampled on. So ultimately, I think it goes back to your [ ? ] presentation today—the nation-state is the most effective vehicle for delivering it. That's where the R2P principle is, I think, a bridge—because it does put the onus on the state to earn its sovereignty, not to have it by entitlement and by divine right—to earn it by protection of your people, which means *all* your people. And if you don't provide that protection, that increasingly brings the international community, or parts of it, into play to begin to require it.

The second part goes back to an earlier question about democracy itself. We still haven't figured out how to do global democracies yet, although with the advent of these little machines I think we're probably getting close—people can start plugging in and voting in the ether. I still think that there is that—what's that word the Europeans use, complementarity?—that you have the level of government which is most appropriate to the issues that you want to resolve. And I think that some of these issues can be resolved within the confines of a state system—as long as the states do not see themselves as being all-powerful, and with total impunity, which I think began to happen. We inherited that from the kings, that once you got there you could do whatever you wanted. Increasingly, through transparencies, and through accountabilities, and all the rest of it, we're beginning to limit that power of the state—although I think 9/11 set that back by several decades; I think it brought in a whole new regime of state power that began to restrict individual rights. But I think we're generally on the track; I think the international justice system is holding states accountable for that behavior, holding the Pinochet's, and the Milosevic's, and the Bashir's accountable; but I think it still should be delivered through the state system for now. And I think the best combination ultimately is that network system, where states are major players, they have the power titled to them, whether by election or by the application of force, but that they are subject to a very different set of standards about their behavior, and they are held accountable to those by that network. So I don't see the state disappearing, but I do see it changing at a quite dramatic rate. And I certainly see, as Sir Martin Gilbert said, the concept of sovereignty is already, I think, fundamentally altered, and we'll never go back to the ultimate state theory that was under Westphalia.

**Barnes:** The European word is “subsidiarity.”

**Axworthy:** “Subsidiarity,” yes. I don't know how that translates into German; it's probably three times as long, but I think it's a way of basically saying, as we've done in our federal systems in both of our countries, to try to apply the appropriate level for the problem that needs to be fixed. The problem is, how do you fix these that transcend boundaries and borders? That's our big hang-up; that's the big hang-up that R2P is trying to resolve. That's the way I see it.

**Ross:** I'd like to ask Jeremy a follow-up question. Jeremy, when we introduced you, we mentioned your democracy project, and I think you did briefly. That was not really the subject of today's talk, but, everybody, Jeremy will be talking about that in his Regent's Lecture in the Spring, so I hope you can come back and listen to that. How are you thinking about the connection between these two projects—how do democratization and R2P fit with each other?

**Kinsman:** Several of the things that Lloyd says about R2P apply, Peter, to democracy. One of them is human indivisibility. The rights—human rights—we claim they're universal; and there are various covenants we've all signed, that they're universal. And when they're abused, we, as democrats, have a responsibility to protect. The same problems of state sovereignty arise vigorously in democracies—you saw Ahmadinejad claiming the people protesting the stolen election were there because they were in the pay of the BBC and the CIA. Those narratives will always be there, and it's our responsibility—we can't go in there and invade them, but we can deny them legitimacy. But abuse of rights and abuse of *lives* are, I guess, different degrees of abuse, Rita. We tend to be able to accommodate abuse of rights, as long as people aren't abusing

lives: in Srebrenica or Rwanda, it was an abuse of life. Again, indivisibility applies. I think the same swirl—the sense of collective responsibility for norms, but instrumentation is emerging on responsibility. I was very persuaded by what Lloyd said about the ICC becoming in fact a constellation now of different instances of legal pursuit, of responsibility and rights. So I think they're connected. The difference, I guess, is that on democracy, there's no single standard: it's not California, it's not Belgium—

**Ross:** It's not Berkeley?

**Kinsman:** It's a nuclear-free zone—I like that! But we know what *non*-democracy is; we know what the abuse of people's rights are. People spoke—last night, I guess—about hierarchy of needs, and safety and security, predictability being important. But there's no gold standard: it really is the rights of people to be able to articulate, through civil society, their own conditions. But responsibility to protect is different, and it is inherently the intervention . . . Peter, you seem to be worried about the intervention to protect—violations, not just of people's rights, but violations of people's lives, in some vindictive exercise.

**Scott:** I'm not so much worried as I'm confused; and I'm learning a great deal today.

**Kinsman:** Yes—I mean, it *is* a new art form. Don't forget, the Westphalian system dominated . . . the United Nations, the charter may say “We the peoples” but it is “We the states.” That's what it is: it is the states. That is changing. As I said before today, people are grudgingly giving it up. If you're Mexican, or Iranian, or Algerian, or Chinese, you have had historical experience of interference in internal affairs, so you're very loath to go there. But, the indivisibility of experience is becoming more and more current. I find it fascinating, the way dictatorships, repressive regimes, authoritarian regimes, adopt democratic vocabulary. Deng Xiaoping, back before Tiananmen, back in the early eighties, people were worried about reform—he enunciated three principles which were going to govern. This is when they took the famous decision not to follow the Soviet model economically. The three principles that would govern governance in the People's Republic; and the second principle was something called “the people's democratic dictatorship.” Because even dictators know “democracy” is a good word; it's a good concept. I think “responsibility to protect” is the same kind of thing. I don't know if that's any kind of an answer, but I think they're mutually supportive.

*Professor Graburn thanked all participants, wished a message of thanks sent to David Trim for having put the conference on the right track, commended Dr. Axworthy for his “very visionary exposition of R2P,” and professed himself more optimistic than he had been that morning. With his words, the conference on Canada, Humanitarian Intervention, and the “Responsibility to Protect” came to a close.*