



UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

BERKELEY - BRITISH COLUMBIA SYMPOSIUM

NORTH AMERICAN FUTURES
CANADIAN AND U.S. PERSPECTIVES



UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

“NORTH AMERICAN FUTURES”

A Conference Summary

This document summarizes and synthesizes the discussion at the North American Futures conference. It draws on the prepared papers, panel presentations, and question and answer sessions. We invite additional comments on the conference website. The summary was prepared by Jeremy Kinsman in his role as conference rapporteur.

Introduction

The Berkeley-University of British Columbia conference on March 12-13, 2010 presented participants with colliding sets of preoccupations at the start, but generated momentum toward a set of roughly agreed propositions by the end.

Coming in, the prevailing view was that the bilateral Canada-US relationship was at best in a state of stall, with Canadians believing that the gains of NAFTA had been reversed in substance and in spirit.

The conference heard a “realists” view that the US was too preoccupied by homeland security and domestic and foreign challenges to have much time or political capital to spend on Canada. But a contrary view portrayed the US administration as being potentially receptive to Canadian proposals for well-constructed continental cooperation projects in strategic areas key to the competitive position of the US and North America as a whole.

The conference heard well-prepared presentations on the potential for such cooperation in joint stewardship of the Arctic, and the swirl of issues affecting energy, the environment and climate change. There was also a

persuasive case made for more substantive cooperation on a trilateral basis with Mexico.

On the wider question of whether North America is indeed a continental “whole,” public opinion does not yet see it as such, but project-by-project functional integration could through “doing” encourage a greater sense of North American as well as national identities.

Keynote panel

The central preoccupations emerged clearly from the opening keynote panel of former high-profile Ambassadors and foreign policy leaders Allan Gotlieb and Thomas Pickering. In their time they were each chosen for key roles according to their country’s central interests; Gotlieb as Ambassador to Washington, and Pickering as US Ambassador in the capitals critical at specific times to the global super-power: Israel, India, El Salvador in war, the UN when Soviet cooperation enabled it briefly to work decisively, and Russia itself.

As Canadian Ambassador in the 1980’s, Allan Gotlieb had been a forceful advocate and protagonist of the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States, a strategic choice for Canada that was undertaken at considerable political risk because of opposition on the argued grounds closer continental integration would erode Canadian national and cultural identity (not borne out in reality).

Gotlieb brought to the conference regret that over the last two decades, Washington had lost the US belief that Canada had strategic relevance to US interests. America’s preoccupations in foreign policy with a changing world, the overriding priority given to homeland security in the wake of 9/11, and the protectionist impulses that reasserted themselves in Congress after the financial crisis exposed an eroding competitive position for much of US industry, all meant that the Canada-US border had re-thickened in ways that strangled the hard-negotiated gains of the Free Trade Agreement. Having lost in the process Canada’s recognition as a very special relationship for US policy-makers, “We don’t know where we are going.” The realistic likelihood of launching and reaching a “grand bargain” to secure the predictability of a more integrated mutually profitable relationship seemed to Gotlieb very remote.

Thomas Pickering put a brighter face on a possible future for the two countries. If – and it was agreed throughout the conference it is a big and crucial “if” – leadership could be provided from the top, several “project-models” that could be determining for North American futures could be developed, entirely “win-win” for both sides: he cited cooperation in the Arctic, complementary energy strategies, the creation of shared cross-border facilities for customs and immigration, and a binding arbitration and settlement mechanism for commercial disputes.

Ambassador Pickering acknowledged the severity of American preoccupations, including in a rapidly-changing world. But he stressed ways in which Canada’s internationalist influence and activity could have the by-product of creating political capital for Canada in Washington, especially with an administration whose foreign policy is demonstrably multilateralist and consultation-based. The widening distribution of global power potentially enhances Canada’s value as a diplomatic partner of the United States. Ambassador Pickering cited American acknowledgment of Canada’s sacrifices in Afghanistan, for example, and called on Canada to commit itself more alongside the US to helping Mexico confront its problems. Both issues resonated through the conference.

Allan Gotlieb welcomed the “can-do” optimism of Tom Pickering, particularly if it could secure binding arbitration for commercial disputes, “the holy grail” of Canadian hopes. But he remained sceptical the deadlocked US Congress was capable of enlightened consideration of such longer-term issues. He also wondered if Canadian foreign policy was still up to meeting such leadership expectations. Canada’s foreign policy assets had been allowed to run down by successive inward-looking minority governments. As to the bilateral government-to-government picture, he reinforced the warning that since there is in Washington little appreciation even of Canada’s strategic value role as America’s principal supplier of energy, a broader vision of the continent’s potential for joint “win-win” projects is absent.

It was hoped that the conference could be a contributing step in a recuperative process. These themes were indeed taken up in the vigorous panel discussions that followed.

Cultural identity

Moderator Pierre-Marc Johnson introduced the scene-setting panel on demography and values as one in which speakers would try to tackle the issues of “self” and “the other” in North American societies, immigration, and the role of the state, and how these can inform policy-making in government.

The review of opinions and attitudes of North American peoples was jointly presented by conference co-hosts Professors Jack Citrin of Berkeley and Richard Johnston of UBC.

International Social Survey data (2003 and 2006) show a greater than expected rough convergence on most essential values and attitudes; as panelist Colin Robertson put it, Canadians and Americans “are similar, if not the same.”

The usually cited differences – Canadians are more apt to favor a more active role for government as a guarantor of the “social contract”, because it is seen to have delivered; Americans are more apt to profess evangelical Christianity as important to their identity – are borne out by the data but not to an extent likely to pose a political inhibition to more intensive strategic cooperation, even greater integration, on a continent-wide level.

Joe Clark and others pointed out how as settlement immigration cultures, the two countries in recent decades have been enlarging their populations from different predominant sources: Canada from South Asia and China; the United States from its Hispanic neighbourhood to the South, but in both cases with relatively little controversy. The doomsday scenario ascribed to Samuel Huntington, for example, that American identity would be eroded by Hispanic inroads had no support at this conference. Drs. Citrin and Johnston found that both countries are generally comfortable with an inclusive construction of who belongs, but at the same time there is majority support, especially in Canada, somewhat surprisingly, for the blending of immigrant streams into a common culture rather than the institutionalization of cultural differences through identity policies.

Indeed, the notion that the North American community has a trilingual composition was advanced as a cohering asset. However, there was little convincing evidence that Canadians, Americans, and Mexicans yet feel an

overlapping North American common identity. Dr. Citrin pointed out that such a sense of multiple identities and shared community across the three countries would be more likely to emerge from greater evidence and experience of functional cooperation and integration.

Managing the Economic Arena

Presenter Dr. Rod Dobell argued for economic policy and reflexes that would be more socially responsible and equity-conscious. But ensuing discussion of economic issues tended to darken the mood.

Initial commentary from presenter Dr. Brad DeLong of Berkeley stressed that American political and economic governance was too overwrought with immediate internal issues and consequence to favor adding in new initiatives of major dimension. Chrystia Freeland of the Financial Times expected that now is not the moment to expect the US to think about “non-US solutions;” the critical US political issue is unemployment and the principal stance is defensive. Brad DeLong asked rhetorically, “If the US can’t even manage the economy on behalf of its own citizens, what chance is there it could do so for the partial benefit of the citizens of Canada?”

Yet, intra-NAFTA trade was in decline. Expectations for the re-invigoration of NAFTA had to take account of the fact it would take a major effort to get the US to live up to its existing treaty obligations under NAFTA, though there is at least some acknowledgment politically the US has been in violation of obligations to Canada on both softwood lumber and Buy America. Preoccupation with US political and institutional gridlock meant there was little discussion of whether agreements could be negotiated for greater convergence in regulations and standards affecting finance and trade in goods and services.

Response from discussants and the floor pushed back against what appeared as laconic and inward-looking detachment from the challenges of international reality.

David Emerson stressed the over-arching fact of America’s competitive erosion in the globalizing world economy. He laid a lot of blame at the door of the role of money in US politics, arguing that this had made the US so protectionist, and contributed to counter-productive border thickening. Strengthening globally efficient North American supply chains in a more

vigorous NAFTA is essential to restoring the competitive position of all North America.

He described the effects of globalization in positioning China in particular to “take us on.” The challenge argued for essential collaboration on such issues as climate change among North Americans, and in response to an observation from Pierre-Marc Johnson, possibly among North America and the EU. However, it was underlined by Brad DeLong and others that there should be no question of an alliance against China.

China could be effectively engaged in a positive way from a North American platform, possibly in coordination with EU partners, though the “realist” view was that the US would actually prefer to opt for a G-2 relationship of its own with China.

Chrystia Freeland expected the environment to be an increasing point of tension between the US and Canada. David Emerson agreed that the “geopolitics” of the environment/natural resources swirl of issues could become more fractious before there is a strategic convergence on North American solutions, but that the logic of the argument in favor of a North America-wide approach to shared problems would become increasingly apparent politically.

As these issues are also driving global agendas, discussion took up with interest the potential significance of the proposition in the Dobell paper that North America could indeed be a “first mover” on such questions in global discussion and eventual resolution – similar to Ambassador Pickering’s proposal the two countries seek to identify “project-models.”

This led to the recommendation North American coordination also take place on the larger trilateral basis including Mexico, across a range of economic and infrastructural policies, a theme that was taken up in subsequent panels.

National and International Security Affairs

Moderator Joe Clark sought a discussion of national security that would not only be about the Canada-US border, but that would also consider opportunities for cooperation in the wider world.

On the border, the joint presentation by Professors Janice Gross Stein of the University of Toronto and Steve Weber of Berkeley did emphasize the transformative effect of US homeland security preoccupations in the wake of 9/11. The presentation's construction ascribed to the US the role of "policy-maker" and to junior and asymmetrically more dependent Canada the role of "policy-taker." In its effort to convince the US of its reliability as a security partner, Canada had judged it had no choice but to increase cross-border security in ways that made the border both "thicker and stupider" and added transactional costs.

On international security affairs, the presentation argued that the US policy-making process had become dysfunctional, and seemingly impervious to a Canadian "value-proposition" of value-added support, much less a new bilateral strategic bargain.

However, this view was challenged.

First, while it was recognized that the extent and complexity of the US domestic and international agenda makes it difficult for the administration to develop at this time an over-arching Canada-US strategic partnership initiative, it was suggested that the US political level could well be receptive to Canada taking the lead in putting forward a "strategic vision and plan" that would have emphatic championing from the top: bottom-up construction would hit a low bureaucratic ceiling.

The possibility of developing a common security perimeter proposal as part of this should be seriously examined by both sides. A question was posed if common perimeter policies would pose politically insurmountable national identity issues, but this reservation was noted as probably more a ritual reflex than a reality.

Allan Gotlieb re-emphasized that the most important foreign policy question to Canada is indeed the interference of freedom of movement on the border. "If foreign policy isn't about this, what's it about?"

Commenting on world affairs, he did see the opportunity for Canada to create political capital in Washington by using its talent for creative international foreign policy but warned that Canadian foreign policy resources, especially human, have been run down.

In addressing world affairs, Paul Heinbecker anticipated a future less dark than the one that painted US diplomacy as dysfunctional. He believes that world conditions would be very suited for Canada's "kind of diplomacy." Several discussants related this point on world conditions and recent history to Ambassador Pickering's belief the predisposition of this administration favors multilateral and consultative diplomacy to which Canada's diplomatic assets could make a significant contribution, including via more North American "caucusing" in multilateral fora.

The prediction was made, though, that the Canadian Parliament's resolution that Canadian troops should be retired from Afghanistan in 2011 would re-emerge as a problematic political issue between the two countries. Paul Heinbecker noted the potential political liability of seeming not to hear the importance of Afghanistan politically to the American President. The issue was referred to several subsequent times at the conference but was not really aired, implicitly because it is reckoned the state of Canadian public opinion about the extent of Canada's sacrifice to date in Afghanistan shows little sign the issue could be re-visited politically. However, the marker was set down.

There was also support for the notion that in taking joint action, North America could be a "first mover" internationally on some key issues. Joe Clark saw this as an exercise in international persuasion, of coalition-building. One opportunity for North American cooperation and caucusing could emerge from Mexico's oncoming hosting of COPS 16 on climate change.

However, this vision of North America as first mover ran smack into the low level of current political ambition in Canada. Janice Gross Stein underlined the necessity of both Canadian and US governments sharing belief in the "North American first mover" imperative, which is not the case.

On a "lot of things, we're last movers," warned Heinbecker, especially climate change strategy. The realists' warning in the joint presentation paper that "getting what you wish for" from a US turn toward multilateral sharing of responsibility will incur costs for Canada. Being "first movers" would also carry up-front costs and commitments that may be too much for a government with short-term instincts to contemplate.

Co-operation in the Arctic

Dr. Franklyn Griffiths enabled participants to view how critical Arctic issues might become a possible model project in common between Canada and the United States, enabling them even to become “first movers” on wider and essential international cooperation on the Arctic. The end goal has to be to build capacity for international collective action on the environmental, legal, security, economic, and social issues affecting the Arctic region and peoples.

Most of the inhabitants of the Arctic are Russians (3 million), a result of Russia, like Norway, having developed over time a coherent Northern strategy. Russia shares several perspectives with Canada: the emphasis is on establishing “possession” and asserting sovereignty where possible. Looking to development of oil and gas reserves as a matter of national interest is also a shared trait of current policy. (Griffiths actually counsels that there is a lot of unfounded “hype” about the extent and exploitability of resources from the Arctic seabed.)

Instead of concentrating on such narrow nationalist perspectives, Dr. Griffiths counsels an approach emphasizing cooperation and the obligations of international stewardship. He has concluded that sovereignty and security are best assured by interdependence.

The Russian presence in the region is so large that effective stewardship of the Arctic is impossible without their positive participation. Russia must be encouraged to be better stewards. Their waste disposal practices (including nuclear) have in the past been deplorable. The encouraging news is that Russia has stressed both the rule of law and the Law of the Sea for settling disputes.

The Arctic Council was set up a decade ago to promote such cooperation but has been let drift by the 5 littoral members (Russia, Canada, the US, Denmark, Norway) who have chosen exclusive consultation among themselves which has created tension with the 3 non-littoral Arctic countries (Finland, Sweden, and Iceland), as well as with parties very interested in the Arctic for natural resource reasons (e.g., Germany) or navigation (egg, China). There was a query as to why it is in Canada-US interests to enable such countries as China and Germany to enjoy observer status with the Council with the right to speak, but Prof. Griffiths held to the view that

enlarging the web of interdependence would be the most effective form of international stewardship.

Dr. Griffiths endorses the soundness of the idea that Canada and the US could build together a strategy for evolution of the region as a whole. The two countries should work together to strengthen the Northern continental security perimeter. Though the US Navy has traditionally been opposed to Canadian territorial assertions in regard to sea that the US Navy considers open waters, at the end of the day the Navy is interested in an Arctic Sea that is “safe, secure, and stable.” However, the US will not wish to prejudice the US position on international waters such as the Strait of Hormuz by positions accepted on the Arctic.

Responding to a proposal from an earlier panel, Dr. Griffiths believes Canada should proceed by proposing to the US a basic principles agreement on Arctic management and stewardship.

Discussant Prof. David Caron underlined concurrence about the urgency of moving forward internationally. Arctic countries are each making an inventory of potential national assets as the ice recedes and the Arctic region becomes “less abstract and dormant as a space.” Critical to the agenda is responsible governance; Canada and the US should be looking together toward Arctic neighbors, and across the Arctic to other interested countries. The “drivers” are the impact of climate change on natural resource development and, increasingly plausibly, the exploitation of methane potential from permafrost lands.

Energy, the Environment, and Climate Change

The panel on energy and climate change brought together several of the above strategic and political strands.

Caught in an international vacuum that moderator Pierre-Marc Johnson described as “Kyoto: targets without actors; Copenhagen: actors without targets,” Canada and the US are at an energy/climate change crossroads whose resolution had the potential to be a strategic game change for the whole continental relationship.

A forceful presentation by Berkeley professor Daniel Kammen argued in favour of integration on the energy front. The integration already realized

among Canada, the United States, and Mexico on the electricity grid supports the view that great efficiency gains are available through partnership, including at local-local levels, though grid technologies could be “smarter.”

On climate change, the basic scientific conclusions are irrefutable. A graphic presentation illustrating the loss of 50% of Arctic ice cover since 1980 restated the rapidity of change.

The connection to energy production is central. But even though the cost of energy production is “the biggest piece of the global economy,” the gains of moving decisively to limit exposure still takes second place to the perceived short-term political costs.

The benefits of being an “early actor” include a possible major jobs dividend from new industry. But North America is falling behind: India leads on wind technologies, China on solar. The importance of the issue indicates public research and development funding ought to be merited on a scale consonant with the Manhattan and Apollo projects, not to mention security projects such as “star wars,” or the “war on terror.”

Carbon pricing is called for in as many jurisdictions as possible, in advance of federal and international adoption.

Prof. Kathryn Harrison of UBC saw no carbon pricing initiative on either country’s federal horizon, making it essential that state and local levels take the lead. Describing the California-British Columbia initiatives thus far, and the Western Climate Change Initiative, she underlined the realities that the jurisdictions that are the highest per capita emitters (Alberta and Saskatchewan) have the least incentive to reduce carbon emission, a pattern mirrored by US states.

She regretted that placing a tax on carbon, which she described as “better policy” than cap and trade systems in part because it captured the totality of small as well as large carbon emissions, had earned the reputation of being “bad politics.”

Development of the huge reserves of the oil sands increasingly relies on using as precursor energy inputs relatively clean forms of energy (e.g., natural gas and possibly nuclear) in order to separate out in a “much dirtier”

process sulphur, bitumen, and the eventual oil end product. Presenters saw merit in the governments concerned developing the financial incentives to provide higher economic rewards for exporting energy via the lower carbon precursors instead.

Discussant Tom Huffaker noted this strategy to be considered penalizing to Canadian strategic assets by some. He described gains of 30% in carbon reduction performance by oil sands producers and the “intensity targets” for further reductions, though the degree of commitment to serious reductions of carbon from either federal jurisdiction was repeatedly questioned – the US Congress was paralyzed on the topic, and the Canadian government unmotivated, essentially awaiting a “made in USA” solution.

Discussant Jeffrey Simpson underlined that right now, Canada can be considered to “lead” in three ways: in hypocrisy in accepting reduction targets that are mathematically unachievable; in the number of useless plans in which such unachievable and hypocritical targets occur; and ultimately in emissions per capita. In that the Canadian Prime Minister has never given a speech in Canada devoted to the topic, he agreed hope for change will need to reside for now in sub-federal and even local levels. An example put forward was Berkeley, CA’s own PACE program (Property Assessed Clean Energy).

The optimistic view underscored that compared to more intractable public policy issues such as enduring poverty and social inequity, carbon reduction just “isn’t that hard.”

As to a grand bargain on energy/climate change, Dr. Kammen emphasized progress will need to be incremental and emerge from positive experience with working continentally to build confidence. Exploitation of the reservoir of Canadian oil sands should be done in a “clean” way rather than as just a convenient fix to reduce dependency on Mideast oil.

The electrical grid is a good place to concentrate in a first instance: investment decisions are already based on integrated North American market assumptions. Next steps should be to organize research and development and planning on a continental basis, to insure that innovation and manufacture for a “smarter” grid is North-America based.

“The Trilateral Perspective” – Mexico, the US, and Canada

In introducing the panel devoted to Canada and the US and Mexico, moderator Maxwell Cameron pointed to the range of different opinions as to what North America is or could become. He asked the essential question as to whether or not there is a sense of shared purpose among the three countries.

Presenter Robert Pastor laid out the case for building a North American community, emphasizing the benefits of scale and greater prosperity that would accrue from outcomes based on rules rather than on balances of power.

He was essentially critical of the myopic Canadian reticence to join with the US to engage Mexico, a seeming contradiction to Canada’s traditional penchant for multilateralism. The reluctance was variously attributed to the Canadian reluctance to link Canada-US outcomes to less tractable US-Mexico border issues, and the belief that because the Mexican issues are rooted in a much larger US domestic political constituency, the trilateral framework blurs and dilutes what Canadians claim is the “specialness” of the Canada-US relationship.

Dr. Pastor pointed out that in eight years there had been little progress on Canada-US border issues while the US and Mexico are making progress, a process that would have been accelerated if Canada had been at the table. Canada was in fact the country of the three best-positioned to take the lead in moving the concept closer to reality.

He and discussant Jennifer Jeffs cited a number of areas where work could be done on a three-way basis: a North American trade tribunal; an inter-parliamentary committee (scuttled by Canada); a North American investment fund; strengthening the North American investment bank; the appointment of special envoys for trilateral affairs; a variety of initiatives in improving the Mexican law enforcement and judicial process, from digitization of records to police training; educational exchanges; partnerships on environmental, energy, and development issues. Some of these initiatives could engage the public imagination in ways that NAFTA could not.

Dr. Jeffs spoke to the “powerful” message to the international community a North American success in working on a regional basis would make, with the enhanced legitimacy that a grouping of a super-power, a middle power, and a developing country could provide. She supported Dr. Pastor’s advice that for Canada “the road to Washington goes through Mexico City,” agreeing that a foreign policy that prioritizes the US really should engage Mexico. Canadians do not seem to understand the importance of Mexico in Washington that Dr. Pastor illustrated by references to the size and prominence of the US-Mexican congressional caucus.

Though subsequent speakers conceded Canadian views had indeed been misplaced and self-involved, they stressed the need not to opt for abandonment of dual bilateralism that Dr. Pastor deemed “dysfunctional,” but to pursue bilateral and trilateral tracks simultaneously, because the resolution of US-Canadian issues are vital to Canadian interests.

Various speakers supported the notion that as a multilateralist, Canada should practice sincere multilateralism in its own region, though there is some scepticism that for purposes of generating deployable political capital for Canada, “the road to Washington goes through Mexico.” Joe Clark recalled that the transformative political debate in Canada had been over the FTA with the US in 1988, whereas NAFTA was relatively uncontroversial. In the US, it had been the opposite. To the notion that Canada had “abandoned a beachhead” in stepping back from trilateralism, he argued that the beachhead had yet to be built in the general consciousness of Canadians. Various speakers noted that Canada had got into the trilateral arrangement with Mexico not from an inherent vision for North America, but for defensive reasons.

To the question as to why greater integration would be in Canadian interests, given that Canada had not succeeded in its relationship with the US in having mutually accepted laws transcend the dictates of politics in determining economic outcomes, Dr. Jeffs pressed the urgency and importance of cooperating with the US and Mexico to help support Mexican democratic governance at a probably decisive time, bearing in mind that the current destabilization of Mexico is the result of drugs, money, and weapons with overwhelmingly North American origins.

Abe Lowenthal noted the appropriateness of the Californian venue for the discussion: it is probably the only US state with the strong presence of both

Mexicans and Canadians; and it is a key centre for producing and communicating knowledge through its university system, the internet/technology industry, and Hollywood. But questions lingered as to how the three populations could develop a shared vision of security; or whether the “values” of NAFTA (identified with the outdated “Washington consensus” of free market philosophy) sufficiently supported the emphases on social equity gaining traction in Latin America (that had been the core of the paper by Rod Dobell).

Overall, the trilateral dimension to North American development and the development of a sense of North American community, however “messy and cumbersome” the current Mexican situation may seem from outside, emerged as central to conference themes. But concrete applications needed to be situated within the “functionalist theory of integration,” integrating not by declaration but by doing. Again, success would reside in political commitment in substance at the very top, that was seen to exist in Washington and Mexico City but that is still not apparent in Ottawa.

“North American Futures: The Challenges of the 21st Century”

The wrap-up panel indeed attempted a wrap-up of the central issues, taking account, as discussant Henry Brady put it, of the “realist-idealist” split in earlier presentations.

The moderator Jeremy Kinsman reviewed the core issues that had emerged – the Canadian assessment that the gains of NAFTA had been wiped out; US preoccupations with a loaded domestic and international agenda and the overriding importance attached still to homeland security; and yet the “invitation” to Canada to articulate a broad vision for North American strategic cooperation (as the country best-placed to do so); the proposal that certain sectors such as the Arctic, energy/environment, border facilities, and Mexico could be project-models and even situate North America as first movers internationally; and that the public sense of a North American community was at best murky.

Colin Robertson spoke to the US capacity to respond to “big ideas.” Proposals should address the opportunities for bold partnership; incrementalism alone would not win the day. Obviously, US homeland security interests have to be served by any significant proposal.

There are multiple points of contact in the relationship that can advance the bold agendas and the building of the sense of common home. He lauded the “hidden wiring” in the countries concerned, including in the university and institute worlds as being multipliers of potentially significant consequence.

Professor Charles Doran found the case for bilateral cooperation in the Arctic to be especially compelling in answering Tom Pickering’s question, “What can we do together that could have a win/win outcome?” Such a project indeed has a major security dimension, in terms of common perimeter issues. If action could also be taken to add cooperation in the Arctic as a responsibility for NORAD it would facilitate greater degree of agreement on issues of territorial jurisdiction and access. This led to interventions by Robert Pastor and Kevin O’Shea on the prospects of including Canada as a partner with the US military’s NORTHCOM as well.

Former Deputy Prime Minister Anne McLellan urged Canada to lift its game. Canadians had taken too long to appreciate the extent to which 9/11 had changed the US political culture and were so focused on the lens of their own economic security that they under-estimated the overwhelming importance to Americans of securing physical, national, homeland security.

Indeed, Canadians are tone-deaf: to their ear, a “thickening border” is “bad.” They don’t hear how to an American ear, it sounds “good.” On Mexico, “what part do Canadians not “get” about the importance of Mexico to the US?” Apart from the security and domestic political significance, the case for supporting Mexican democracy is overwhelming. The case for regional three-way concertation appears irrefutable.

Afghanistan is still alive as a bilateral issue – we heard it. Canadians have to face up to it.

Discussion weighed in on whether there is a “special relationship” between Canada and the US. It was stated several times that Canadians hardly feel special anymore, and also that the US has many “special” relationships, none more special for criticality of content and breadth of constituency than with Mexico. It was pointed out there could usefully be more attentive to the North American dimension in comment and the schools, though it will have to demonstrate more than just sentimental regard for cross-border neighbors. Jack Citrin doubted that civic education on its own would have much impact. He recalled the Haas theses on functional integration in the EU and

suggested that the drug problem represented the kind of common state interest that could favor joint strategies.

Dr. Brady summed up the need to identify the strategic interests in common, so that work can begin on the suitable big projects – the Arctic, energy/environment, the border, cooperation with Mexico.

Abe Lowenthal proposed the project agenda should be taken up by the two universities themselves for ongoing work and as topics for a future conference. He reminded us that the Talmud lauds study because it can lead to action.

Concluding remarks judged that the conference had been a significant event in support of building brighter and more cooperative North American futures. The meeting closed with assurances from UCB and UBC hosts Citrin and Johnston that it was indeed the first of a partnership series. Future UCB-UBC conferences could indeed take up North American cooperation as a central part of their ongoing agenda.

Berkeley, CA, 2010-03-16